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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the Space Shuttle's purpose of low-cost, routine access to space
and hoxx the lessons learned during the Space Shuttle program have affected the thinking
on new heavy-lift launch systems. The thesis objective is to show the Space Shuttle was
an attempt at developing a routine, low-cost access to space but, because of Shuttle-
Unique capabilities, cost-effective operations may never be realized with the Shuttle sys-
tem. The Space Shuttle concept definition is addressed and the impact on design by
DOD influence. The Space Shuttle deelopmental history is presented, and how budg-
etary constraints, coupled with NASA's desire to build a low-cost system resulted in
oxer-runs in schedule and costs. The thesis looks at the operational period of the Space
Shuttle, the use of Gox eminent subsidies to keep the price of a Shuttle launch artificially
low, and the difficulties experienced b3 NASA in maintaining the planned launch
schedule. The Challenger accident resulted in restructure of U.S. space policy as well as
how the Shuttle will be used in the future. In conclusion, lessons learned from the Space
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo space programs of the 1960's excited the Ameri-
can people who were being readied for a new space frontier. But almost 30 years after
John Glenn's historic space flight, the frontier is still remote. Access to space is the
problem. The United States is unable to routinely, and at a low cost, launch payloads
into orbit. Man. space anal- sts believe that once this access barrier is overcome, the
real proliferation of space travel will begin.
In the late 1960's. NASA envisioned a space vehicle that routinely and at a low cost
would be able to launch payloads into space. Add'.ionally, this vehicle would be
manned so satellite repair or retrieal could be accomplished. The secret to low cost
access to space, NASA believed, was in the use of a reusable launch vehicle. This vehicle
became the Space Shuttle which NASA believed would be the United States' -space
truck to earth orbit.
This thesis will examine the Space Shuttle's purpose of low cost, routine access to
space, and how the lessons learned during tie Space Shuttle program have affected tile
direction of new heavy-lift launch systems.
The developmental history of tile Shuttle will be examined from thc post-Apollo
period through the finalized Shuttle configuration in 19S2. Many influences affected the
final Shuttle design including its relationship with the space station as we!l as a manned
nission to Mars. Additionall. Department of Defense and political influences impacted
Shuttle desi2n.
The Space Shuttle development during the 1970's was undertaken in fiscally lean
times for NASA. B:idget constraints had an enormous effect on the Shuttle schedule,
deelopmental costs, and operational costs. NASA developed management styles that
allowed them to produce the Shuttle under meager budget conditions. Shuttle cost
growth and tne delay of the First Manned Orbital Flight were two results of the budg-
etary constraints of the 1970's. When the Shuttle flew its first test flight in April 1981,
it was experiencing a two year delay in development and cost over runs of almost 2
billion dollars.
After a series of four test flights, NASA declared the Space Shuttle operational and
starzed to market the Shuttle worldwide as providing a low cost, routine access to space.
NASA envisioned a 24 flight per year capability that started to appear, in the early
1980 s, overly ambitious. NASA experienced problems trying to launch the Space
Shuttle on schedule. This resulted in DOD seeking additional launch capabilities that
would guarantee access to space. By 19S5, space users were beginning to doubt the
routine- capabilities of the manned Shuttle.
The pricing structure that NASA incorporated for the Shuttle in the initial operat-
ing period did not cover Shuttle operational costs. Moreover, the pricing structure,
which was U.S. Goxcrnment subsidized, resulted in commercial launch services becom-
ing less competitive with the Shuttle.
The Space Shuttle saw 24 successful flights before the Chalictiger accident in Janu-
ary of 19S6. The tragedy caused space officials to rethink the Shuttle's role in accessing
space as well as causing a revision in space transportation policy. The resulting policy
called for a mixed fleet of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) and the Space Shuttle, but
the Shuttle w, as to be used only in cases requiring Shuttle-unique capabilities. No longer
would the Shuttle be used to launch payloads that could be easily launched on an ELV.
The grounded period of the Shuttle fleet was over two and one half years. During
this time, man3 revisions to the Shuttle program took place. When the Shuttle resumed
flying in September 19SS, NASA felt the Shuttle was a safer, mere capable launch vehi-
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cle. Itowe'er, the eficienq3 of the Snuttle had further decreased because of additional
safeguards making lou -c,st, routine access to space unattainable for the Shuttle system.
Many lessons can be learned from the Shuttle program in pursuing new launch
systems. The National Securit Launch Strategy sined b President Reagan in Febru-
ary 1985 initiated a joint study by NASA and DOD on the development of a second-
gen eration space transportation system. [Ref. 1: p. 11 This thesis will examine Some of
the findings of the joint DOD - NASA study regarding existing launch v, sterns as well
as the direction f3r future launch sstems. The two proposed systems currently under
inestigation are the Advanced Launch System (ALS) and the Shuttle-derived cargo ve-
hicle or Shuttle-C.
The objective of the thesis is to show that the Space Shuttle was an attempt at de-
elopi;.g a routine, low-cost access to space. but because of Space Shuttle unique qual-
ities, cost-effective operations will never be reI.ized.
The thess conclujes that next generation space transportation svems must learn
from as well as build upon what is learned firom the Space Shuttle program.
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II. DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY
A. POST-APOLLO PERIOD4By mid 1969, the United States space program was at a crossroads. NASA was
finishing up a successful Apollo program and, desiring to continue this momentum, ad-
vocating endorsement by the nation of new manned space ventures:
The next logical step for us to make in space will be to create permanent manned
space stations in Earth and lunar .rbits with low cost access by reusable chemical
and nuclear rocket transportation systems, and to utilize these systems in assembling
our capacity to explore the planet Mars with men thereby initiating man's perma-
nent occupancy of outer space. [Ref. 2: p. 6]
These recoramcndations by President Nixon's newly formed Space Task Group
(STG) were characteristic of NASA's direction for post-Apollo activity.
The STG was made up of Vice President Spiro Agnew as Chairman, Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird, Presidential Science Advisor Lee Dubridge, and NASA Admin-
istrator Thomas Paine. The STG made public in September 1969 three new alternatives
the Nation could undertake in space:
e Establish a 50-man space station orbiting the earth, an orbiting lunar space station,
a lunar surface base, and a manned flight to Mars by 1985. A reusable carrier
would be needed to "shuttle" between the earth's surface and the earth orbiting
station, and a reusable space tug would be needed to service the lunar orbiting
station.
* Establish the earth orbiting station, along with the reusable shuttle but eliminate
the lunar projects and postpone the manned Mars launch until 1986.
* Develop the earth orbiting space station and the shuttle, but defer any decision of
the Mars mission, keeping it only as a goal to be realized before the end of the
century. [Ref. 2: p. 1]
The first txo options carried fiscal price tags in 1969 of S1O billion and S8 billion
annually, respectively, while option three would still require a S5 billion annual NASA
budget over the same time frame. [Ref. 3: p. 180]
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Critics in the Congress, the media, and in the public generally opposed the mag-
nitude of the space program plans presented in the STG report, to say nothing of the
funds necessary to meet the program goals. [Ref. 4: p. 540]
In his 1968 election campaign, President Nixon pledged to curtail NASA operations
until the economy could afford more funding. After entering office, as part of a general
anti-inflation, multi-billion dollar government spending curb, President Nixon cut the
NASA fiscal year 1970 budget request (submitted by President Johnson) by 545 million
to S3.772 billion dollars, nearly a quarter of a billion dollars less than the 1969 appro-
priation.
Although interested in seeing a continuation of large space projects, the aerospace
industry was not united as to which specific projects should have priority. While several
companies had special interests due to specific space capabilities, industry as a whole
favored the Department of Defense over NASA because of the shrinking NASA funding
and the magnitude of its business with the military. Additionally, Vietnam, the econ-
oni), domestic unrest, state of the welfare program, and other issues commanded more
attention than new space ventures. [Ref. 3: p. 181]
These concerns xN ere reflected in the administration's fiscal year 1971 budget request
to Congress, subnitted in January 1970. NASA's budget was cut to S3.377 billion, S372
million below the fiscal year 1970 appropriation. [Ref. 5: pp. 8-111
After President Nixon was in office only one year, NASA was forced to announce
several major program changes. In February 1970, the Apollo applications program was
renamed Sk3 lab and, while originally planned to coincide with the lunar landing flights,
was rescheduled to 1973 - 1974. In addition, instead of seven crews being sent to two
space stations, only three crews would be sent to a single space station. [Ref. 4: pp.
430-431] NASA also announced the last lunar landing mission (Apollo 20) was being
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cancelled, and by September 1970 the Apollo 18 and 19 missions were cancelled, too.
[Ref. 3: p. 1821
The President's space policy statement of 7 March 1970 was anticipated by the
space community in light of the fiscal activity over the preceding 13 months. The
statement reflected the political realities and the mood of Congress and the public:
Space expenditures must take their proper place within a rigorous system of national
priorities ... what we do in space from here on in must become a normal and regular
part of our national life and must therefore be planned in conjunction with all of the
other undertakings which are also important to us. [Ref.6: p. 3]
While the President's announcement did not back the new large projects as pro-
posed by the STG, the statement did identify three "general purposes which should guide
our space program -- exploration, scientific knowledge, and practical applications."
President Nixon considered the space program to be of low priority in 1970, not justi-
fing increased investment or the initiation of large new efforts as recommended by the
STG. [Ref. 3: p. 182]
NASA was left with identifying a project that would both gain enough political
support for approval and be sizeable enough to keep its development engineers occupied
during the 1970's.
The "Space Shuttle" emerged as that project. NASA promised a variety of Shuttle
capabilities, the primary one being low cost, routine transportation to space. NASA
realized DOD was projected to be one of the '.,,;er users of space and very much needed
DOD support for the Shuttle. According to a 1970 President's Science Advisory Com-
mittee (PSAC) report, the Space Shuttle was projected to solve both NASA and DOD
needs:
(a) Replacing twelve existing launch vehicles "with a STS (Space Transporta-
tion S stem) used jointly by both DOD and NASA as a national transportation
capability."
(b) "Provision for national security contingencies by the ready availability of
transportation to orbit on short notice, with sufficient maneuverability and cross
range capability for a variety of missions." [Ref. 7]
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It was these two objectives -- replacing all existing launch vehicles with a more
economical system and meeting DOD requirements fbr particular national security
missions -- that drove Shuttle design during 1970 - 1971 and led NASA to resist sug-
gestions that a smaller manned system would be an adequate U.S. space initiative for the
1970's. [Ref. 8: p. 1100]
NASA's fiscal funding downward trend did not stop at the S3.377 billion dollar
level, however. By December 1970, Congress passed the fiscal year 1971 appropriation
bill which cut an additional S64 million from NASA's budget. This pattern would repeat
itself through fiscal year 1974 wh;ji NASA suffered its lowest budget in over 12 years,
S3.040 billion dollars. The corresponding figure in relative buying power, or constant
year 1967 dollars, was just oxer S2 billion dollars, and would remain there throughout
the decade. [Ref. 5: pp. 8-11]
B. SPACE SHUTTLE CONCEPT
As early as the 1950's, conceptual design for a multi-regime aircraft were seriously
considered. Such aircraft were conceiN ed to be capable of operating in space, reentering
the earth's atmosphere, and maneuvering and landing as conventional aircraft. Because
of the state of knowledge of reentry heating and h3personic aerodynamics, as well as
relati cl ineficient propulsion. such designs were shelved in favor of more conventional
rocket technology. [Ref. 9: p. 1]
With the advent of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs, propulsion tech-
nologm was significantly advanced and substantial information was obtained on reentry
of spacecraft into the Earth's atmosphere. These developments coupled with substan-
tiallb new technology in spacecraft systems allowed the consideration of earlier concepts
fbr a reusable earth-to-orbit transportation systcm. [Ref. 9: p. 1]
Five aerospace companies began conducting studies for NASA in 1969 to determine
the most practical approach for a Space Shuttle design: Lockheed' Missles and Space
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Company, North American Rockwell Corporation, General Dynamics Corporation,
Martin Marietta Corporation, and McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company. [Ref.
5: p. 114]
In May 1970, NASA awarded North American Rockwell and General Dynamics,
working together as a spacecraft-launch vehicle team, an eleven-month contract to de-
fine more fully their shuttle concept. McDonnell Douglas and Martin Marietta were
chosen to submit a competitive design. Also chosen to conduct feasibility studies of al-
ternate designs were Grumman Aerospace Corporation, Lockheed, and Chrysler Cor-
poration. [Ref. 5: p. 114]
C. THE DESIRE FOR A MANNED ORBITER
The Shuttle would have a unique feature that existing Expendable Launch Vehicles
(ELVs) did not have. Not only did the Shuttle promise to be less expensive but, because
astronauts were aboard, functions that could not be normally performed on satellites in
space could now be executed.
Among the features a manned launcher promised were:
* Satellite services in space. Replacing components or refueling for example. This
promised to extend satellite lifetime, or make operational a satellite in distress.
* Satellite retrieval. If satellite repair in space was beyond the Shuttle and crew ca-
pabilities then the Shuttle could simply place the ailing satellite in the large cargo
bay and return it to earth for refurbishing and later launch.
* Scientific experiments could be performed by Shuttle personnel in tie zero gravity
environment of space.
* Because the Shuttle was carrying personnel to space, the ride to orbit promised to
be mu .h more gentle than existing ELVs. This would allow satellite designers to
be more lenient on satellite launch requirements.
# Astronauts on board the Shuttle would allow for human judgement and flexibility
in space, as well as benefits not yet realized.
Additionally, manned space ventures have a leadership aspect. This was perhaps
the single most important element that gained presidential support. NASA argued that
"the United States can not forcgo its responsibility -- to itself and to the free world -- to
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have a part in manned space flight ... for the U.S. not to be in space, while others do
have men in space, is unthinkable, and a position that America can not accept." This
kind of argument reportedly appealed to President Nixon, who saw astronauts as re-
presenting the very best of American values and said, "we must be on the leading edge
of this kind of technological development." [Ref. 8: p. 1104]
D. DOD INPUT TO SHU.FLE DESIGN
During NASA's Shuttle analyses it was clear that any economic justification de-
pended crucially on the Shuttle "capturing" all U.S. missions likely to be flown during
the 1980's. In particular, NASA had to gain the agreement of the national security
community to use the Shuttle to launch all military and intelligence payloads, which
were projected to be some 34% of future space traffic. DOD support of the Shuttle was
crucial on both political and economic grounds. [Ref. 8: p. 1100]
Accommodating DOD missions required a Shuttle that could handle payloads up
to 60 feet long, could launch up to 40,000 pounds into polar orbit and 5,000 pounds into
geosynchronous orbit (this translates to a 65,000 pound maximum payload into a due
east, 100 mile low earth orbit), and could maneuver to land at the same location from
which it was launched after only one orbit of the earth. Of the major design parameters
of the Shuttle, only the maximum payload width, 15 feet, was based primarily on a
NASA requiremen:, although NASA as well as DOD projected the need for 60 foot long
and 65,000 pound payloads. [Ref. 8: p. 1101]
Perhaps the military requirement with the most impact on Shuttle design was for
high cross range or the ability to maneuver upon reentry to either side of the vehicle's
ground track. The Air Force wanted 1100 to 1500 mile cross-range capability allowing
for a quick return from orbit to military air fields. In particular, the Air Force wanted
to be able to launch the Shuttle into polar orbit from Vandcnburg Air Force Base on the
California coast, have it rendezvous with an aheady orbiting payload, and return after
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a single orbit to Vandenburg. The landing strip would have moved east some 1100 miles
as the earth rotated during the approximately 1 10-minute Shuttle orbit. [Ref. S: p. 1101]
In order to achieve this cross range capability, NASA designed a delta-wing for the
Shuttle, which in turn made the vehicle heavier. Maneuvering during high-speed reentry
also exposed the vehicle to higher temperatures for longer periods as compared to a
"straight in" approach, and required doubling the weight of the thermal protection sys-
tem. These increases in orbiter weight made it difficult to meet payload lifting require-
ments and placed extra demands on the Shuttle's propulsion systems. [Ref. 8: p. 11011
Even though DOD drove many aspects of the Shuttle design, it was not clear how
much military interest there was in the Shuttle or how accurate were the prowct;ons of
future military and intelligence missions on which the DOD requirements were based.
Secretary of the Air Force and once former top NASA official Robert Seamanssaw "no
pressing need" f'r the Shuttle, but characterized it as "a capability the Air Force would
like to have." Aithough most high ranking Air Force Officers favored the shuttle, mo&
were satisfied wid the service's own large expeidable Titan rocket. [Ref. 8: p.1 IlOI
The military's only significant share of Shuttle development costs were those used
to create a launch facility at Vandenburg Air Force Base. DOD agreed in 1971 not to
develop any new launch vehicles of its own, and leaders of the national security com-
munity did conununicate their support of the Shuttle program both to the White House
and to Congress. Many believe the military potential of the Shuttle was another key
factor in NIA-n's deision to approve the Shuttle in 1972.
NASA had i". uwn list of military missions that the Shuttle might perform. For
example:
The shuttle could be maintained on ready alert, making possible rapid responses to
foreseeable and unexpected situations and greatly increase flexibility and tieliness
of responses to military or technological surprises, such as: (a) rapid recovery and
replacement of a faulty or failed spacecraft essential to national security; (b) exam-
ination of unidentified and suspicious orbiting objects; (c) capture, disablement, or
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destruction of unfriendly spacecraft; (d) rapid examination of crucial situations de-
veloping on earth or in space whenever such events are observable from orbiting
spacecraft; and (e) rescue or relief of stranded or ill astronauts. [Ref. 8: p. 1104]
It apparen'ly was Shuttle capabilities such as these that were attractive to President
Nixon. Toy -- )n advisor John Erlichman remembered that "a strong influence was
what oh . ,uld do with a large cargo bay in terms of the uses of satellites" and
"the cap.2 it : .apturing satellites, o recovering them." These factors weighed
heavily in Ni. -n's approval of the Space Shuttle. [Ref. 8: p. 1104]
E. EMPJ "-CNT FACTOR
NASA s)ent some time in developing the Shuttle program employment impact,
partic arly in vie-w of the then-depressed state of the aerospace industr and the up-
coming 1972 presidential elect;on. NASA Administrator Fletcher told the White House
that "an acce!r ae.; start on the Shuttle would lead to a direct employment of 8,800 by
the end of 1972, and 24,000 by the ead of 1973." This was "a very important consider-
ation in Nixon's mind," according to L,;'chman. The White House found that "when
you look at the employment nu -abers and key them to battleground states, the space
rogram bas an importance 'nut of proportion to its budget." [Ref. 8: p. 1104,1
F. SPACE SHUTTLE APPROVAL
Presijent Nixon gave the go-ahead for the Space Shuttle in January 1972 for mainly
the following reasons:
* It would further the United States' manned presence in space.
* It rromised to drastically reduce launching and operational costs through reuse
of vehicles.
* It was of value to the Department of Defense.
* It would employ some 40,000 aerospace workers by the rmid-1970's. [Ref. 8: pp.
1101-1104]
NASA's contractors spent the next ". months refining their designs and adjusting
their ideaq to more realistic budgets and flight schedules. Shortly after teceiving -Fresi-
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dent Nixon's blessing on the Shuttle program, NASA was ready for a Request For
Proposal (RFP) for the development and fabrication of a Space Shuttle Orbiter. Four
companies responded to the March 1972 request -- Rockwell, McDonnell Douglas,
Grumman, and Lockheed -- and delivered their proposals to the Manned Spacecraft
Center in Houston on 12 May 1972. [Ref. 5: p. 114]
On 25 July 1972, NASA announced tha:. North American Rockwell (later named
Rockwell international) would be responsible for the design, development, and pro-
duction of the Orbiter. The value o the contract that was awarded on 9 August 1972
was estimated at S2.6 billion over the next six years. [Ref. 5: p. 114] Rockwell Inter-
national was rc,ponsible for the Orbiter as -well as integration of all Space Shuttle system
components. The prime contractor for the Space Shuttle Main Engines was the
Rockwell International Rocketdbne Division in Canoga Park, California. The Morton
Thiokol Corporation in Brigham City, Utah, is the prime contractor for the Solid Rocket
Motors. The Martin Marietta Corporation, Michoud Operations, Michoud, Louisiana,
is the prime contractor for the ExternalTank. [Ref. 10: p. 13]
NASA faced five major technologic:ni hurdles in Space Shuttle development:
* To use a recoverable, inexpensive solid k iellant booster.
• To reduce the design weight of the Shuttle so as not to decrease the 65,000 pound
payload capability.
* To develop a new thermal protection system since thr .c. ,;eld principles of
previous manned systems were inadequate for a reusable sk rtie.
* To design and test new high performance rocket engines for the orbiter.
To solve the requirement for an on-board, self-contained flight control system.
[R. 3: pp. 1S5-lS6]
G. SPACE SHUTTLE CONFIGURATION
I. Space Shuttle Design Evolution
The Shuttle program saw many evolutionary design changes in the beginning.
The first design was based on a "fly back" concept in which two stages, each manned,
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would fly back to a horizontal, airplane-like landing. The first stage was a huge, winged,
rocket-powered vehicle that would carry the smaller second stage "piggy back". The
carrier would provide the thrust for lift off and flight through the atmosphere, release the
orbiting vehicle, and return to the Earth. The Orbiter, carrying the crew and the pay-
load, would continue into space under its own rocket power, complete its mission and
then fly back to Earth. [Ref. 11: p. 2]
The Orbiter vehicle was designed to be considerably larger than the Orbiter of
today. It carried its rocket propellants internally, had a flight deck sufficiently large to
seat twelve space-station-bound passengers and a cargo bay big enough to accommodate
space station modules. The Orbiter size put enormous lifting and thrust-generating de-
mands on t,'2 first-stage. [Ref. 11: p. 2]
This two-stage, fully reusable design represented the optimum Space Shuttle in
terms of routine access to space, however, it was less than optimum in terms of the
funding required, so NASA :*ad to rethink their designs. [Ref. I: pp. 2-3]
NASA finally found the design that would gain them the green light in devel-
opment -- the Space Shuttle of today.
2. Space Shuttle Components
See Figure I for the current Space Shuttle configuration. The Space Shuttle is
a combination of three major components: the delta-winged Orbiter, a pair of solid
propellant boosters, and a large external liquid propellant tank.
The Orbiter is the principal part of the Shuttle. Designed to last 100 flights, this
winged vehicle is part spacecraft, part aircraft. It carries payloads in a 15 by 60 _ 't
cargo bay in the middle of the fuselage. Forward of the cargo bay is the crew compart-
ment where the astronauts live during a space flight. Aft of the cargo bay are three main
orbiter engines that help propel the orbitcr during launch. The Thermal Protection
System on the Orbiter's exterior enables it to survive the searing heat of atmospheric
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reentry. After reentry, the vehicle becomes a glider as it makes an unpowered approach
and landing on a runway. On-board auxiliary power units provide power for the hy-
draulic system that operates the control surfaces during the atmospheric flight. Hydro-
gen and oxygen are combined in fuel cells to provide electricity and water. [Ref. 12: p.
13-61
The three engines on the aft end of the orbiter, called the Space Shuttle Main
Engines (SSMEs), are advanced liquid fuel rocket engines. They burn liquid hydrogen
and liquid oxygen under high pressure to create the maximum thrust needed to augment
the launch. Each SSME has a rated thrust of 375,000 pounds (1.6 million newtons) at
sea level. The thrust can be varied from 65% to 109% of this rated value. (Ref. 12: p.
13-6
Propellants for the SSMEs are contained in the large External Tank (ET). The
tank, made of alumninum, is 154 feet (47 meters) long and 27.5 feet (8 meters) in diameter.
It is the largest single Space Shuttle component and the only component that is not re-
used. When the contents of the ET are depleted, it is allowed to reenter the atmosphere
to break apart and burn up over the Indian Ocean. Two large conduits feed prcpellants
into the Orbiter's aft fuselage from the ET. [Ref. 12: p. 13-9]
At launch, two large solid-propellant rockets are attached to the tank, one on
each side. These are the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs), which provide most of the power
to lift the Shuttle off the pad and propel it during the first two minutes of flight. After
their propellants are consumed, the empty boosters separate from the Shuttle and de-
scend by parachutes and land in the ocean. These empty motor casings are recovered
and reused. The Solid Rocket Boosters are 149 feet (45 meters) long and 12.4 feet (3.5










Weight: 1.6 million pound!. (full)
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS (SRBs)
num ~iuHeight:, 149 feet
WVeight: 1.3 million pounds each
Typical mission length: seven to thirty days
Typical crew: two to scven people
Hleight of orbit: 135-320 nautical miles (most missions)
Speed in orbit: 17.550 mph (at 150 miles)
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III. SPACE SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT
A. SPACE SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT
NASA divided managerial responsibility for the Shuttle program among three of its
field centers. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas was assigned management for the
Orbiter. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama was made responsible for
the Orbiter's main engines, the External Tank, and the Solid Rocket Boosters. Kennedy
Space Center, Merrit Island, Florida, was given the job of assembling the Space Shuttle
components, checking them out, and conducting launches. [Ref I1: p. 41 See Figure 2
below for Space Shuttle management organization.
9 POLICY
OFFICE OF SPACE FLIGHT e ADVOCACY
* UORET
NASA HEADQUARTERS 0 MARKETING
* 'CORPORATE MANAGEMENT"
•~ EXTIERNAL RELAIONS
, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SHUTTLE PROGRAM OFFICEINUTEGATON (LEVEL 11l)
SCUSTOM'ER SERVIES (JSC]
JSC PROJECTS KSC PROJECTS MSFC PROJECTS loo IsTe ..
* ORBITER 0 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIP * MAIN ENGINES 0 MAIIN ENG!NES
* ORBITER CREW EQUIP * LAUNCH & RECOVERY OPS * EXTERNAL TANK TEST FACILITIES
" FLIGHT OPERATIONS * PAYLOAD PROCESSING 9 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
" PAYLOAD INTEGRATION * SPACELAB
Figure 2. Space Shuttle Management Organization
B. SPACE SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
NASA and the Space Shuttle prime contractors use the term -constraint manage-
ment- to characterize the management philosophy which was used for the Space Shuttle
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Program. The objectives of this technique were to minimize total costs, as well as min-
imizing fiscal %cear funding requircments. In implnmenting this management philosophy,
continLsenc-} funds were identified and eliminated at all levels from stbeontractor to
prime contractor to 'NASA Field centers, and at NASA Headquarters prcgramn rese.Ves
were consol-iated and maintained, This managem ent approach was in sharp contrast
to the Apollo era when money constraints were essentially nonexistent. [Ref. 10: pp.
5S-5911Whisle this approach had limited success in minimizing the funding for any given
fiscal x ear, the constraints did not control program cos: growth and schedule changes.
In the earb. .ears, the -constraint management- approach eliminated contingency
funds and forceJ managers to employ, innoiatihe, cost efflective tcchniquez, fur accom-
plishing the stated objecti~ es. Deflerral of work to future years was both necessary due
to funding constraiats bi the Office of Budet and Management (0MB) and feasible
from a cost and schedule point of iew. although there was an increase in cost and
schcdule rislk-. [Ref. 1f): p. '591
After fiscal c~ 19716. and be-einning wvith the fabrication of major test and flight
hard-a arc. conzinued defe-rral o.f",or. to %c~re'ars SIS!'nificantlh increased thec cost and
scnedu'e risk. When work .-.as added to a given fiscal year for unanticipated or. antic-
ipazed chances. N.ASA programi manaccrs, had four options to cover the additional
work:
* Defer some other work to the next fiscal year;,
* Delete some other work:
" Attempt to TiE the added work in-; and
" Co- cr the additional iaork with reserves which wev-re maintained b'. NASA Head-
quarter.-. [Ref. In: pp'. 59-&)
Atternpiing to lfit the added cvaf in- and defcrmiil of work to the f1ollowting fiscal
%year were used cx:enc,-e to at.comnodatc significant amounts oil adw-ed work- Tbi-
resulted in rnajor manacement eff-o.-s at the ent'A of the fiscaI vear to -livc7 within the
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fiscal year funding constraints wlich was referred to as "managing to get out of the fiscal
year." [Ref. 10: p. 60]
Work deferral to the following year resulted in more effort with a greater value and
different schedule for the following year. The complexity of the cumllative effect of a
large number of deferrals was greatly under-estimated by NASA management.
At the end of the fiscal year, the Shuttle managers' time and attention were re,
peatedly dominated by efforts to get out of the fiscal year, leaving inadequate opportu-
nity to address the equally important job of estimating "budget year" funding
requirements. [Ref. 10: p. 601
C. BUDGET CHRONOLOGY (1972 - 1979)
In March 1972, NASA committed to development of the Space Shuttle using re-
usable Solid Rocket Boosters for a total cost of S5.15 billion (1971 dollars), a First
Manned Orbital Flight (FMOF) scheduled for March 1978, and an Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) scheduled for March 1979. [Ref. 10: p. 47]
When the Space Shuttle program was first authorized, the plan called for an Orbiter
fleet size of five ,,ehiules with launch site capabilities at both Kennedy Space Center and
Vandenberg Air Force Base. The Space Shuttle Program included two phases. The
Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) Phase called for the fabricatioh
of Orbiter 101 for testing. including the approach and landing tests, and full scale vi-
bration tests; the fabrication of Orbiter 102 in a flight configuration; and a refurbishment
of Orbiter 101 to a flight configuration after the use of the vehicle for testing. The sec-
ond phase or Production Phase called for the fabrication of Orbiter 103, Orbiter 104, and
Orbiter 105.
With the submission of the fiscal year 1974 budget and as a result of an S85 million
reduction by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to NASA's budget request,
NASA announced a 6 to 9 month delay in the First Manned Orbital Flight (FMOF)
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schedule with no change in the Space Shuttle Program cost estimate at completion.
[Pf. 10: p. 471
During fiscal year 1975 budget negotiations, OMB once again made a reduction in
the NASA budget request amounting to S89 million, which NASA announced would
delay the FMOF by an additional 6 months until June 1979 and would increase the total
DDT&E program costs by S50 million (1971 dollars). [Ref. 10; p. 47]
NASA's fiscal year 1976 budget request was also reduced S45 million by OMB, al-
though NASA did not reflect a change in program run-out cost or schedule.
For fiscal year 1977, NASA's funding request was reduced by S15 million in
DDT&E and SS5 million in production which NASA assessed would increase DDT&E
total program costs b3 S20 million with no change in schedule of the FMOF. [Ref. 10:
p. 471
In September 1977, at the time of submission of the fiscal year 1979 budget to
OMB, NASA announced that due to technical and cost problems in fabrication and test
actixities the total program estimate increased by 4% based on experience in building
Orbiter 101. [Ref. 10: p. 47]
In Ma3 1979, NASA announced additional cost growth resulting from cumulative
effects of technical problems, increased fabrication and assembly efforts on Orbiter 102,
tcchnical changes to the external tank, and problems during certification testing of the
main engines and solid rocket boosters. The effect of these problems was estimated to
increase the total p:owuction cost by $250-5350 million in 1971 dollars and delay the
FMOF until early 1980. [Ref. 10: p. 47]
The NASA fiscal year 1979 budget request submitted to the Congress in January,
197S did not include any funds for a fifth orbital vehicle. During the fiscal year 1979
authorization hearings, NASA stated that during formulation of the budget, they were
specifically given approval for a four Orbiter fleet operating from the east and west
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coasts, with the understanding that additional Orbiters would be considered for funding
in future years in the event that projected flight rates, actual operating experience, or the
loss of an Orbiter warranted augmentation of the Orbiter fleet. However, funus for long
lead items for a fifth Orbiter were both-authorized and appropriated to provide flexibility
for exploitation of the Space Transportation System (STS) capabilities and to provide a
backup for any unforseen loss of an orbiter vehicle. Additionally, considerable economy
could be realized if production was initiated in fiscal year 1979. [Ref. 10: p. 47]
Many program observers believed the key problem for the Shuttle was in the fact
that it was under-furfed from its inception. At the time of Shuttle approval, President
Nixon did not allow for NASA's 20% contingency reserve fund that was needed for de-
veloping the new technology. Most NASA management personnel agree that it was that
basic shortfall at the Shuttle birth that has bred the major difficulties of today. [Ref
13: p. 518]
In addition, the Shuttle agreement was made in 1972 to provide NASA with a level
budget each ,car so that rational plans could be made, and this was not the case. Hence,
each year Shuttle r, 'nagement had to meet a reduced budget level that was handed
down b the administration -- after yearly work plans were laid out. This required a
replanning of work usually after work already begun. This is a very disruptive and in-
efficient approach for NASA, their contractors, and the subcontractors. Shuttle work
required continual reprogramming. More people were sometimes required for replan-
ning work than were doing the work. This was the inevitable result of the Shuttle Pro-
gram when it started out under-funded. [Ref 13: p. 518]
Under-budgeting became de facto Space Shuttle policy rapidly, and a key job be-
came meeting a reduced annual budget level. Also, it became de facto Space Shuttle
policy to borrow funds or take funds from the operational phase of the Shuttle program.
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NASA was forced to substitute schtdule contingency fot dollar contingency. [Ref. 13:
p. 518]
Then Deputy Director of the NASA Ames Research Center, A. Thomas Young,
summarized the Shuttle funding in a report given to the Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications:
Space Shuttle funding on a fiscal year basis has been less than that required to meet
established schedules. This has been accepted as the 'way of life' by Shuttle man-
agement who haxe evolved management techniques to cope with limited funding
situation. Demanding work plans have been utilized in an effort to apply pressure
to maximize accomplishments for available funds. A direct consequence is a work
plan that is inconsistent with the budget. In the absence of adequate funding re-
serves, schedule has been used as a reserve for delaying work that could not be
funded. This approach has forced a focus on the near-term with frequent significant
adjustments in the work plan to assure remaining within the fiscal year funding
limitations. The principal management objective appears to have been to conduct
the First Manned Orbital Flight (FMOF) as soon as feasible with available funds
and to allow production orbiter schedule delays as required. [Ref. 13: p. 420]
D. COST GROWTH
Fiscal years 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 saw an increased infusion of funds into the
Shuttle DDT&E program. In fiscal year 1977, an increase of funds of S55 million :'ent
to DDT&E. Twentx-five million was from the economic Stimulus Appropriations Act
of 1977 and S30 million from the space flight operations budget, S27 million of which
was residual Apollo-Soyuz test project funds. This increased funding was used for
technical problems encountered in the Orbiter, SSMEs, Solid Rocket Booster, and Ex-
ternal Tank, as well as additional manpoi% er -needed and subcontractor buildup. [Ref.
14: p. 141]
In fiscal year 1978, S100 million of funds were transferred from production to
DDT&E to proxide for increase3 effort resulting from deferrals and delays from fiscal
3ear 1977 and 1978. These funds were applied to the Orbiter, Solid Rocket Booster, and
External Tank in areas of testing, subcontractor cost growth, and increased manufac-
turing costs. [Ref. 14: p. 142]
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In fiscal year 1979, additional funds were identified from a requested S185 million
supplemental appropriation from Congress. Also an additional $10 million was repro-
grammed from the Teleoperator Retrieval System (TRS) project and a S70 - S90 million
transfer from Shuttle production funds. These funds were used in solving .technical
problems in all major components of the Space Shuttle system as well as providing funds
needed for the launch and landing aspect of the system. [Ref. 14: p. 143]
NASA felt that Space Shuttle production funding in fiscal year 1979 was con-
strained due to the uncertainty of the fiscal year 1979 supplemental request submitted
to Congress. This funding constraint, together with technical problems, resulted in
schedule delay of production orbiters. Because of this constrained buildup, NASA felt
that it was not possible or productive to use the full S458 million that was allotted in
fiscal year 1979 for production. So NASA felt that a S70 to S90 million reallocation of
these production funds to deN elopment would have no- further impact on production
schedule. [Ref. 14: p. 119]
By June 1979, NASA said that the original estimate of S5.15 billion in 197 1 dollars
had grown to almost S6.0 billion dollars -- a total cost growth of about 15 percent. (See
Table 1.) Se enty million dollars of this increase was caused by schedule stretch-outs
resulting from OMB budget limitations. The balance of the increase resulted from
technical problems encountered during development and test. [Ref. 14: p. 417]
NASA was seeking a S220 million budget amendment for fiscal year 1980. This
:,dditional amount vas to be useci for development and would alleviate the need to re-
allocate money from production assuming the cost projections were accurate and no
additional unexpected technical problems occur. NASA felt the S220 million would al-
low the .rbiter production program to proceed at a pace to support projected launch
needs. [Ref. 14: p. 121]
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In both the-fiscal year 1979 supplemental (S 185 million) and fiscal year 1980 budget
amendment (5220 million) cases, the additional funding estimates were developed to al-
low the continuation of the pace of development, test and manufacturing activities nec-
essary to meet the projected launch requirements. The specific estimates were a result
of program status evaluations in the late summer of 1978 and spring of 1979, respec-
tively. These program evaluations took into consideration schedule status and the need
for additional resources to compensate for technical problems, design changes, schedule
delays and the underestimate of work efforts subsequent to the estimate provided in-the
applicable Congressional budgets. The need for additional funding represented the best
judgment at the particular time of the program requirements, allowing a minimal reserve
for unanticipated changes and growth. NASA knew the additional resources would not
provide the program iuith the funding flexibility to accommodate major unforeseen
problems and growth. [Ref. 14: p. 160)
In February 1982, months after the FMOF of the Shuttle system, NASA estimated
the DDT&E completion figure at SIO billion. In terms of 1971 dollars, this equated to
approximatelh S6.S billion dollars or a 31 1% increase over the original S5.15 billion dollar
figure. (See Table 1.) [Ref. 15: p. 1256]
Ironicall), the official cost target for Shuttle development was fixed by the White
1-louse in January, 1972, at the lower end of a 20% (SI billion) range in the estimated
probable costs submitted by NASA at the time. This indicated to both the space agency
and the presidential review committees that Shuttle costs haN e actually been as predicted
in 1972, including the need up to 1979 for an additional SI billion to finish the develop-
ment. [Ref. 16: p. 21)
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Table 1. NASA SPACE SHUTTLE DDT&E CHRONOLOGY
Budget First Initial Operating Total DDT&-E Change
Year Manned Capability Cost ($1971, ($!971,
Orbital billions) billions)
Flight
FY 1973 March March 1979 S5.150 ...
1978
IY 1974 Dec. 1978 Dec. 1979 S5.150
FY 1975 June 1979 June 1980 S5.200 + SO.050
FY 1976 Same Same Same -
FY 1977 Same Same 55.220 + SO.020
FY 1978 Same Aug. 1980 Same _--
FY 1979 Same Aug. 1980 S5.430 + S0.210
FY 1980 Dec. 1979 Ma " 1981 5-.654 + SO.224
Actual Apr. 1981 Feb. 1984 S6.800 + Sl.l,16:1
E. SCHEDULE
The Space Shuttle Program was initiated as a fiscal program -in 1971. An important
consideration was to scope the program such that NASA could continue a balanced
aeronautics and space program within a strained total budget level. In the first few years
of the Shuttle Program. fiscal year funding of the Shuttle was less than that requested
from OMB. With a limited budget and a lean technical program, the only alternative
was to use the near-term schedule as the flexible element of the- program. The impor-
tance of the F'IOF milestone was recognized, and its schedule was given priority
throughout the program. By necessity, the production Orbiters were allox'ed to slip in
schedule as required to meet the funding requirements. [Ref. 13: p. 433]
As of February 1977, Orbiter 102 (Columbia), the first orbital flight vehicle, was
scheduled for delivery to Kennedy Space Center in August 1978. Orbiter 101
(Enterpise), following its use in the mated ground vibration tests at Marshall Space
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Flight Center, was to b- refurbished and delivered to Kennedy Space Center in June,
1981. Orbiters 103 (DisL.. very) and Orbiter 105 (cut fromthe fiscal year 1979 budget)
were to be delivered to the Western Test Range in March, 1982, and March 1984, re-
spectively. Orbiter 104 (Atlantis) was scheduled for delivery to Kennedy Space Center
in March, 1983. Internal schedule adjustments in the Fall of 1977 called for delivery of
Orbiter 102 to Kennedy Space Center in October, 1978, a slip of twomonths. Further,
NASA decided to modify the structural test article for use as the second flight vehicle
with a delivery date to Kennedy Space Center of February, 1981. Delivery of Orbiters
103 and 105 would each slip six months from the February, 1977 schedule. This plan
did not include the use of Orbiter 101 as an operational vehicle. [Ref 17: p. 51
In September 1978, NASA reported that an internal Shuttle program review was
completed to permit an accurate, updated assessment of cost, schedule, and perform-
ance. As a result of this review, NASA determined that all program elements could be
read, for a September, 1979 FMOF if all planned tests were successful. Recognizing the
possibilit% of unforseen problems and tests which are not entirely successful, NASA
stated at that tine there was a good probability of flying the first Shuttle flight in
Calender Year 1979. NASA further stated that the current plan was to schedule the first
operational flight for February, 19S1. NASA reported that these changes would impact
both cost and schedule as well as the funding requirements fox fiscal year 1979 and fiscal
year 1980. [Ref. 17: p. 6]
In September 1973, NASA announced that additional technical problems including
the SSMEs, the Thermal Protection S, stem, necessary design changes, and an additional
engine test stand would result in a six month delay for the FMOF until September 1979.
In Januar3 1979, NASA announced that the FMOF would occur on 9 November 1979.
This date was selected for planning and scheduling purposes. These delays resulted in
an additional 4-percent increase in totalcost estimates. [Ref. 17: p. 61
25
Due to funding constraints in production funding in fiscal year 1979 and with as-
sociated technical problems, NASA was led to announce in June of 1979 delivery im
pacts on production Orbiters. Preliminary schedule impacts on production orbiters were
estimated at approximately six to twelve months on Orbiters 099, 103 and 104. [Ref.
14: p. 119] (See Table 2 for 1979 production Orbiter delivery dates.)
Table 2. PRODUCTION ORBITER DELIVERY DATES AS OF FY 1979
Orbiter Projected Delivery Date
Columbia, OV- 102 First flight Orbiter
Challenger, OV-099 March 1982 .
Discovery, OV-103 Summer 1983
Atlantis, OV-J04 Fall 1984
OV-105 Cut From Budget
1. Production Orbiters
Since that original estimate, planning for the implementation of the Orbiter
fleet was impacted by budget reductions, Orbiter delivery schedule adjustments, revised
estimates (based on experience in the developmental phase), and new requirements
identified as development neared completion.
Some examples of the above included:
* the fiscal year 1977 budget decision to defer the start of production;
* schedule adjustments related to NASA's realignment-of program funding between
DDT&E and production in fiscal years 1978 and 1979;
* the fiscal year 1979 budget decision to delay proceeding with a fifth orbiter;
* the actual Orbiter and main engine fabrication and assembly experience on devel-
opment hardware;
* the delivery schedule stretch-out included in the fiscal year 1980 and 1981 budget
plans;
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* the identification of new requirements, such as the orbiter weight reduction pro-
gram and systems engineering support.
Based on the combined effects of these varied impacts, the estimated 1981 fig-
ure to produce the fleet of operational Orbiters was S3.556 billion in 1981 dollars. This
estimate provided for modifying Orbiter 102 after its use for the Orbital flight test pro-
gram and early operational flights, upgrading the Orbiter structural test article (Orbiter
099), and the fabrication and assembly of two additional Orbiters and associated main
engines. [Ref. 15: p. 33741
2. First Manned Orbital Flight (FMOF)
By Summer 1979 NASA was facing a seventh month delay in the EMOF which
in tura caused a delay in the first operational flight. NASA estimated Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) to be late Summer 1981. This permitted NASA to fly only one mission
in fiscal year 19SI and ten missions in fiscal year 1982. This also reduced the flight rate
from twentx -three to eleven in fiscal year 19S 1-82. NASA felt the lower flight rate would
make it possible to reduce fiscal year 1980 funding requirements for flight hardware
protr.ment. -lowexer, NASA feared the loss of reimbursements due to cancellation
c reimbursable flights may offset this reduction. [Ref. 14: p. 124]
NASA was also concerned that the delay in the FMOF and the consequent
rcscheduling of the first operational flight may cause some commercial and foreign users
to consider an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) instead of the Shuttle. However, a
surve, conducted by NASA of the early customers at that time indicated little interest
in launching on the more expensive expendable systems. [Ref. 14: p. 1271
NASA planned for some time to support up to six Delta and one Atlas,'Centaur
launch Nehicles as potential back-ups in case the Shuttle was not a% ailable for customer
mandator, launch dates. These vehicles could be requested by the user up to the FMOF
of the Shuttle; after that, the user must wait for Shuttle availability. [Ref. 14: p. 127]
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NASA believed that since utilization of the Shuttle by DOD did not commence
until late 1982, DOD requirements would be satisfied in accordance with requested
launch dates, providing no further Shuttle delays were experienced. Delay of the FMOF,
therefore, apparently did not have a significant impact on DOD requirements as far as
NASA could determine in June 1979. [Ref. 14: p. 128]
The operational date slip caused by the delay in the FMOF generally moved
all operational missions a similar period. NASA attempted to hold important missions
with mandatory launch windows to the then present schedules at the expense of lower
priority, non-scheduled constrained missions. This arrangement was recognized to affect
?rimarily NASA missions only.
In addition, cargo manifests were revised to take full advantage of available
cargo bay space as well as Shuttle weight and turn-around capabilities. These changes
were felt to minimize the impact of the FMOF delay. [Ref. 14: p. 129]
The number of planned Space Shuttle developmental Orbital flight tests were
reduced from six to four. Although NASA planned to specify that the Space Shuttle
would be considered operational on the fifth flight, in reality the Shuttle would require
research and development activities for some time. [Ref. 17: p. X1
By January 19S0 NASA projected the launch cost to have increased from early
projections of S10.5 million per flight to S15.2 million per flight in 1971 dollars. To
minimize these costs, NASA placed increased emphasis on production activities partic-
ularly with regard to reducing the unit costs of the External Tank and the Solid Rocket
Boosters. [Ref 17: p. XI]
F. DEVELOPMENTAL TECHNICAL CONCERNS
As of November 1979 some major Space Shuttle Milestones were reached. These
included:
The basic detailed design of the system was completed.
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" Virtually all wind tunnel testing and scaled vehicle testing were successfully com-
pleted.
" The Orbiter Enterprise (OV-101) and the Orbiter structural test article Challenger
(OV-099) completed their testing.
* Fifteen of the Shuttle Main Engines were produced, and-the three SSMEs for the
first orbital flight test were at the launch sight and installed.
* The successful Approach and Landing Test Flight series was completed. This
consisted of eight captive flights coupled with a Boing 747, and five free flights re-
leased from a Boing 747.
" The full scale mated vertical ground vibration tests were successfully completed
utilizing the Orbiter Enterprise, a flight type external tank, and inert solid rocket
boosters.
" The Enterprise, external tank, and inert Solid Rocket Boosters were successfully
utilized to verify the launch facilities at Kennedy Space Center.
* The Orbiter Columbia (OV-102) was delivered to the launch site and, despite
problems with the thermal protection system, was progressing on remaining sub-
system checkout activities.
T:e first flight External Tank was delivered to the launch site and was undergoing
ch;:ckout.
All Solid Rocket development motor firings plus two qualification motor firings
were successfully completed. One remaining qualification motor firing was sched-
uled for early" 19s0.
The Solid Rocket Motor for the first orbital flight test were delivered to the launch
site in November 1979.
The first launch and landing facilities at Kennedy Space Center and Dryden Flight
Research Center were essentially ready for first flight. [Ref. 17: pp. 15-16]
As of November 1979, the most significant remaining concerns to NASA regarding
the Shuttle Program and the FMOF included:
* Overall Main Engine development leading to certification.
, The Orbiter thermal protection system.
1. The Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs)
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) development program experienced a
mixture of accomplishments and major setbacks following a 1980 Congressional review.
Delays in the program and changes in testing and certification schedules increased the
work effort and program costs. [ReF. 17: p. 19]
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Space Shuttle Main Engine progress was substantially slowed during the latter
part of 1979 due to delays in restarting the Main Propulsion Test (MPT) after a July
1979 MPT incident involving failure of the Main Fuel Housing. The Main Fuel Valve
Housing was subsequently modified and incorporated into field units. An attempted
main propulsion test was again aborted on November 4, 1979, due to failure of the high
pressure oxygen turbopump seal and rupture during engine shutdown of the hydrogen
fuel line. The resulting design modification caused further delays.
Also discovered at that time was the use of incorrect welding wire uSed in crit-
ical areas of SSMEs. There are about 1800 welds on a SSME of which 200 are consid-
ered critical. Each individual weld on every SSME was inspected and corrected on a case
by case basis. [Ref. 17: pp. 19-20]
The SSME production schedule was also changed following a May-June 1979
Congressional review. Production engine fabrication was accelerated and three new en-
g;ies were added to the program to provide five SSME Qigh: sets. These changes im-
pacted the funding requirements in fiscal year 19S1. [Ref. 17: p. 211
2. Orbiter Thermal Protection Tiles
After the Orbiter Cohimbia was delivered to the Orbiter Processing Facility, it
was discovered, by testing, that some load conlition- imposed during the ascent phase
of the flight could over stress the TPS (Thermal P. .zection System) tiles. As a conse-
quence, an extensi e testing program was instituted to proof load approximately 24,000
tiles and replace or install approximately 10,000. This effort proved to be ver. labor
intensive and was completed around Mari.: 1980.
The primary area of concern or doubt was in the testing of two particular types
of tiles installed on the upper surface of the Orbiter. Due to testing techniques, these
tiles required more time and effort than was actually planned. [Ref. 17: p. 181
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G. FLIGHT TESTS
The first Shuttle test flights were conducted at Dryden Flight Research Facility,
Califernia, in 1977. The test craft was the Orbiter Enterprise, a full size vehicle thaE
lacked engines and other systems needed for orbital flight. The purpose of these tests
were to check out the aerodynamic and flight control characteristics of the Orbiter in
atmospheric flight.
Mounted piggyback atop a modified Boing 747, the Enterprise was carried to alti-
tude and released for a gliding approach and landing at the Mojave Desert Test Center.
Five such Rlights were mad#-. They served to validate the Orbiter's computers and other
systems. They also demonstrated the craft's subsonic han. 3;ne qualities, in particular its
p-erformance ini the preciSe unpowered landings that would be required on anl Shuttic
flights. :Ref. 11: pr. 41
By early 198 1, the Space Shuttle was ready for the Orbital fi. ht test programn. This
w~as des' Z-aed to include more than 10H)L tests and data collecion proccdt-res. A H. fIicghts
were to be- laurnched from Kenned% Space Center, arid terminate at Edtards, Air Force
Eaxse. where the Dryi-en Flight Resca-.ch Facility is located.
Originrail nnded for a Ax rnission program, the Orbital test series was rzduced
to four flichts:
" STS-l (Smoce Transporzation System - First i"li~ht). April 12 - 142. 1981. Oriviter
co.'60:Na. %was a two-dant derr nstration of the Orbiter's abllityv to co into orbit and
rezurn to Earth safe'. ItS i.n a load was a fielat instrumentation pallet con-
taining eq uipmcnt for recorodng temperatures. pressures and acceler7ation levels at
various points around Elhe O:bitEr.. In addition, there were chekouts of the cargo
bay doors, attitude control sy.stemn and orbital marceuverina system.
" STS-2. Ncvcmber 12-14. 19S1 - Orbiter CoIronbid. marked the first test of the Re-
mote Nianipulating S'strni -nd carried a patload of Earth survq'. instruments.
This was the first time- any spacecraft had flow,.n twice. Failure of a fuel cell
shortencul the flight by about three days.
" STS-' . March 22-30', 19S2. Orbiter Columbia, wvas the lonzest ofr the initial test se-
necs. staL-inc aloft for ciaht days. Activities included a special tetc te npu-
lazor in whtiCh the robot armi remo~ed a package of instruments frenn the pzayload
bay but did not release it into space. The flight included expesrimcints in1 rrnatcrials
procsing.
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STS-4, June 27 - July 4, 1982, Orbiter Columbia, featured another test of the robot
arm, which extended a scientific payload over the side of the payload bay, then re-
stowed it. Materials processing experiments were conducted, as were a number of
scientific investigations. This flight carried the first DOD payload. [Ref. 11: pp.
4-5]
With the landing of STS-4, the Orbital flight test program came to an end with 95
percent of its objectives accomplished. The interval between flights was trimmed from
seven months to four, then three. NASA declared the Space Shuttle "operational."
Many erroneously believed that the Shuttle had attained an airline-like degree of routine
operation, when in reality much was still to be learned about the Shuttle. Since the
Shuttle was considered operational, NASA placed payload requirements over spacecraft
testing, which required larger crews. [Ref. 11: p. 51
H. SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONS
By the early 1980's the Shuttle was the most complex space launch vehicle ever built
with specialized capabilities never before seen in access to space. The launch and land-
ing profiles are an example of this.
1. Launch Profile
See Figure 3 for a typical launch profile. (Source: Ref. 18) Most prelaunch
checks a:e performed by computer, but special crews board the Orbiter five hours prior
to launch to ensure all controls are properly set. The astronauts board the Orbiter at
approximately two hours prior to lift-off and perform additional preflight checks. [Ref.
18: p. 1.6]
At 3.8 seconds prior to launch or T-3.8, the computers command the SSMEs
to fire. The first SSME fires at T-3.46 seconds, followed by the other two at 120 milli-
second intervals. This in turn causes the Shuttle to lurch forward about 40 inches to-
ward the ET.
The SSME's builds up to 90% thrust by T-0, and a timer set for 2.46 seconds










Figure 3. Space Shuttle Launch Profile
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allows the Shuttle to be upright at solid-booster ignition as it sways away from the initial
lurch toward the ET. [Ref. 18: p. 1.6]
Thrust from the SRBs builds up quickly and the vehicle lifts off at T+ 3.0 sec-
onds. Eight seconds after launch the Shuttle rolls 120 degrees to the right, and assumes
a "heads down" position. During ascent the thrust of the SRBs decreases and the
SSMEs are throttled to keep acceleration below 3 g (three times earth gravity). [Ref.
18: p. 1.6]
About 50 seconds into the flight the Shuttle reaches the speed of sound, Mach
I. By time the SRBs consume their propellants (T+2 minutes and 12 seconds) the
Shuttle has reached Mach 4.5 and an altitude of 28 miles (45 kilometers). The empty
SRB ca.ings separate from the vehicle and land in the ocean via parachute. They are
retrieved, refurbished, and later reused. [Ref. 18: p. 1.6]
At this point of the flight, the Shuttle consists of the Orbiter and External
Tank. It continues to gain speed and altitude; at 6.5 minutes into the flight, the speed
is approxirnatelI 15 times the speed of sound at an altitude of 80 miles (130 kilometers).
The Shuttle now performs a long shallow dive to 72 miles (120 kilometers). Near the
end of this di% e, 8.5 minutes after liftoff, the SSMEs are shut down. The External Tank
is discarded twenty seconds later to splash down in a remote ocean area. [Ref. 18: p. 1.6]
Following ET separation, the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS), consisting
of two 6,000-pound-thrust (26,700 newton) engines, fires to place the Orbiter in a low
elliptical orbit. Half an earth orbit later, about 45 minutes after launch, the OMS en-
gines fire again to place the Orbiter in a higher circular orbit, generally 250 miles (400
kilometers) in altitude. [Ref. 18: p. 1.71
One of the first tasks of the Shuttle crew is to open the cargo bay doors. This
is necessary because there are radiators located on the inside surface of the doors that
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dissipate heat accumulated within the Orbiter. f-this heat is not discarded, the mission
is aborted. [Ref. 18: p. 1.7]
2. Landing Profile
See Figure 4 for a typical landing profile. (Source: Ref. 18) Near the end of
the mn'.ision, the cargo bay doors are closed and the Orbiter is maneuvered so that the
tail section is flying "first". About 60 minutesprior to landing (L-60), the OMS engines
fire to slow the vehicle so it will enter the atmosphere. A pitch maneuver configures the
Orbiter with nose pointed forward and up at an angle of 28 to 38 degrees. Atmospheric
entry begins at an altitude of 400,000.feet (122,000 meters) and a distance of about 5,000
miles (8,000 kilometers) from the landing sight. [Ref 18: p. 1.71
During entry, the tremendous energy of the Orbiter (which begins entry at a
speed o.- 16,500 miles per hour) is dissipated by atmospheric drag. This generates enor-
mous heat - portions of the Orbiter exterior reach 1510 degrees centigrade (2,750 degrees
fahrenheit). The heat ionizes air molecules near the spacecraft, so from about L-25
niinutes to L-12 minutes the vehicle is enveloped in a sheath of electrically charged par-
ticles that blocks radio signals between the spacecraft and the ground. This "communi-
cation blackout" occurs at a critical portion of the flight. However, all maneuvers can
be performed b either on-board computers or the Shuttle pilot without ground com-
munications. [Ref. 18: p. 1.7)
Rate of descent and range are controlled by bank angles; the steeper the bank
angle, the gieater the descent rate (and also greater heating rate). The Orbiter's nose
swings left and right as several hypersonic banks are made to control the flight path.
At around L-20 minutes, maximum heating occurs. [Ref. 18: p. 1.8]
As the craft descends, it becomes a glider - an extremely large heavy one. The
transition from control by spacecraft reaction control jets to aerodynamic-control sur-
faces is made in stages. When a speed of Mach 3.5 is reached as well as an altitude of
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45,000 feet (13,700 meters) the rudder becomes effective and the control jets are shut
down. [Ref. 18: p. 1.8]
Descending at a rate of 10,000 feet (3,000 meters) per minute, the 100-ton
(90,000 kilogram) Orbiter is on a glideslope of about 20 dlgrees.
At an altitude of 1,750 feet (530 meters), the nose is pulled up in a "preflare"
maneuver to reduce the glideslope to 1.5 degrees. By-the time this maneuver is complete,
the altitude is 135 feet (41 meters).
The landing gear extends when the Orbiter is below 90 feet (27 meters), 14
seconds before landing. After the gear extend and lock, a final flare is made to reduce
airspeed to 215 mph (345 kph). The Orbiter lands first on its main aft gear then drops
onto the nose iheels. It rolls to a stop and is met by a convoy of ground servicing ve-
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Figure 4. Space Shuttle Landing Profile
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IV. OPERATIONAL SPACE SHUTTLE
With the ending of the four flight orbital test series, the Space Shuttle was consid-
ered operational by NASA; however, since the original estimate, planning for the im-
plementation of the operational Orbiter fleet was impacted by factors such as:
* budget reductions;
* Orbiter delivery schedule adjustments;
* revised estimates based on experience in the developmental phase;
* new requirements identified during the development test flight program;
* the FY 1977 budget decision to defer the start of production;
0 schedule adjustments related to NASA's realignment of program funding between
DDT&E and production in FY 1978 and FY 1979;
* the FY 1979 budget decision to delay proceeding with a fifth Orbiter;
• the actual Orbiter and main engine fabrication and assembly experience on devel-
opment hardware;
* the deliver, schedule stretch-out included in the FY 1980 and FY 1981 budget
plans; and
* the identifikation of new requirements such as the Orbiter weight reduction pro-
gram and systems engineering support.
Based on the con bined effects of these varied impacts, the 1981 estimate to design,
develop, test, and procure the fleet of operational Orbiters was S3.5 billion, was equiv-
alent to S1.6 billion in FY 1971 dollars. [Ref. 19: p. 761
Additionally, the resulting Space Shuttle in 1981 did not have the originally planned
capabilities as the Space Shuttle in 1971. (See Table 3.)
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Table 3. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED AND PROJECTED SPACE SHUT-
TLE
Item Originally Proposed in Projected Capability in
1971 1981
Payload Launch Capabil- 65,000 lb . 65,000 lbs
ity
Flight Rate 60:year 24,1year
Max On-Orbit time 30 days 10 days
Cost per Flight (Smil, 34.5 83.3
1982)
Orbiter Turnaround Time 160 hours 35 days
Max Altitude L600 nautical miles 400 nautical miles
A. SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION HISTORY (PRIOR TO CHALLENGER
ACCIDENT)
After the ninth Space Shuttle flight (STS-9), NASA changed the method for num-
bering missions. Each flight was designated by two numbers and a letter. The first digit
indicated the fiscal year of the scheduled launch (e.g., 4 for 1984). The second digit
identified the launch site (1 is the Kennedy Space Center, 2 is Vandenburg Air Force
Base). The letter corresponds to the alphabetical sequence for the fiscal year (e.g., B is
the second mission scheduled). [Ref. 11: p. 51
Including the initial orbital tests, the Shuttle flew 24 successful missions over a 57
month period prior to the Challenger accident in January of 1986. Columbia made seven
trips into space, Discovery six and Ailantis two. Challenger flew most frequently -- nine
times -- prior to the accident. [Ref. 11: p. 6] (See Table 4.)
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Table 4. SPACE SHUTITLE OPERATIONAL MISSION HISTORY (NOV. 1982
TO JAN. 1986)
Flighlt Date Vehicle Highlights
Number
STS-5 Nov. 11-16, Columbia Launchied two communication satellites,
1982 first operational flight
STS-6 Apr. 4-9, Challenge FrtEANSAcmmunications sat-
________19S3 ______ ellite deployed
STS-7 Jun. 18-24 Challenger Remote Mani1pulator tested, first re-
I trieval of an orbital object
STS-8 Au : 61 Challenger Robot Arm tests
STS-9 TNov. Columbia First Spacelab. Return of Columbia after
28-Dec. 8, one year mod.
19S3 ____
41 -B IFeb. 3-11, Challenger Two Satellites fail to reach orbits due to
19S4 _______Perigee!'Apogee motors
41-C 1Apr. 6-13, challenger Retrieval,repair, and redeploy, of Solar
11984 M_____ ax. ____________
41 -D Aug. Discovery 3communication satellites deployed
30-Sp. 5,
1984
41-G Oct. 5-13, Chzallenger Earth observations
1984
51-A Nov. 8-16, Discoveiy Retrieved two satellites from flight 41-B
_____ _____ 19S4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
51-C Jan.24-27, Discovey DOD payload
___________ 1985 ____________________
51-D Apr. 12-19, Piscovey Two commercial satellites deployed
19S5 _______ ____________________
51-B A,)r. Challenger Second Spacelab mission
216-May 6,
___________ I 1985 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
51-G IJun. 17-24, Discovery Three communication satellites deployed
_______________________ 1985 ___________________
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51-F J ul. Challenger Third Spacelab mission
29-Aug. 6,
1985
51-I Aug. Discovery Three communication satellites de-
27-Sep. 3, ployed. LEASAT-3 retrieved, repaired,
1985 and redeployed
51-J Oct. 3-10, Atlantis DOD mission
1985
61-A Oct. Challenger Fourth Spacelab mission
30-Nov. 6,
1985
61-B Nov. Atlantis Astronaut assembly of structures in orbit
26-Dec. 3,
1985
61-C Jan. 12-18, Columbia Satellite deployment. Pictures of Comet
1986 -Halley
51-L Jan. 28, Challenger The accident
1986
B. SHUTTLE FLIGHT PLANNING
By late 19:79, NASA created the Space Transportation System Operations Office.
This office is charged with the responsibility for planning, implementing, and conducting
integrated STS operations after conclusion of the Orbital Flight Test Program. This
responsibilit incluues transition planning; development of financial plans and pricing
structures; coordinating activities with DOD; and providing all necessary services to
potential users of the STS. [Ref. 20: p. 12)
The management concept selected for STS Operations has three interrelated areas:
1. Operations Management which involves mission planning, flight planning,
payload integration, flight operations, and launchrlanding operations.
2. Business and Customer Service Mandgement which encompasses budgeting,
cost accounting, pricing, customer relations, launch service agreement preparation,
flight assignment determination, and cargo manifesting.
3. Flight Hardisare Management which is concerned with the procurement of
external tanks, refurbished solid rocket boosters, and spares for flight and ground
equipment, sustaining engineering and logistic support. [Ref. 20: pp. 12-13]
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The key document goiverning relations between NASA and the user is the Launch
Service Agreement which all users sign and which describes the services (and conditions
of the services) to be provided by NASA. The agreement is based on published U.S.
Government policy and regulations. In addition, the Launch Service Agreement con-
tains all financial arrangements, termination clauses, launch schedules, description of
proprietary rights, insurance provisions, and other important information the user must
know including a Payload Integration Plan (PIP) whiich contains detailed, technical
launch service specifications. [Ref. 20: p. 18]
1. Shuttle Services
Standard Shuttle services, which are uniform for all civilian users, includes a
basic Shuttle launch for a one-day mission to a standard altitude and azimuth, a crew
of three, and standard support services.
Optional Shuttle services, which must be requested by the user, include special
hardware, analysis, testing, use of Kennedy Space Center facilities and services, and
special orbital operations. [Ref 20: p. 18]
NASA feels one of the most important aspects of preparing for mature STS
operations is the development of a pricing structure and pricing policies which permit
maximum use of the STS while neeting NASA's goal of recovering total operational
costs o er a twelx e year period. The policies would be updated as experience and need
dictated. [Ref 20: p. 15)
NASA published Shuttle civil reimbursement policies in 1977 that incorporated
the fundamental principles upon which user charges for all STS elements are based.
These concepts included:
* no distinction between international and U.S. commercial pricing;
* fixed prices for three years;
* escalation clauses for inflation;
o reduced prices for exceptional payloads;
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* standby payloads;
* provisions for cancellations and postponements; and
* small, self-contained payloads. [Ref. 20: p. 15]
NASA pointed out that these policies would most certainly be amended to
further clarify a number of issues as well as defining such further defining terms and
clauses.
2. Initial Scheduling
NASA identified the principal users of the Space Transportation System:
NASA, DOD, other U.S. government agencies, commercial enterprises, and foreign
governments and organizations. In 1979, NASA's traffic forecasts indicated that, over
the next twelve years, NASA payloads would represent approximately 37% of all pay-
loads, DOD about 29%, and all others 34%. [Ref. 20: p. 201
NASA's plan is to accommodate user requirements as much as possible on a
first-come-first-serxed basis. in the case of conflicting requirements, missions affecting
national security are given top priority. Missions involving significant science and
technology objectives, and reimbursable paloads are given preference over routine sci-
ence and technology experiments. [Ref. 20: p. 20]
In 1979, approximately 29% of all Shuttle traffic was earmarked for Depart-
ment of Defense missions. In accordance with prior NASA agreements, DOD is re-
sponsible for launch and reco cry operations at Vandenburg Air Force Base and DOD
payload integration and planning. DOD reimbursement principles are embodied in an
agreement which stipulates that Kennedy Space Center and Johnson Space Center flight
operation services for DOD missior. are exchanged for Vandenburg Air Force Base
launch services for all non-DOD missions from Vandenburg. [Ref. 20: p. 161
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By 1979, NASA had commitments for the first 38 operational flights, repres-
enting 15 different customers (including NASA). These payloads represented commer-
cial, foreign, DOD, and civil (U.S. Government and NASA) customers. [Ref. 20: p. 21)
C. SPACE SHUTTLE PROCESSING
Since the Shuttle Orbiter is designed to be reused, launch processing includes re-
covering and refurbishing the orbiter and the Solid Rocket Boosters.
At Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Shuttle processing is carried out by contractors
monitored b NASA employees. Approximately 6,500 contractors and 640 NASA em-
ployees directly support Shuttle launch operations at KSC. Johnson Space Center has
responsibili, for on-orbit mission operations and some launch operations, which in-
volve about 5,675 contractors and 1,065 NASA employees. Marshall Space Flight
Center Lontributes engineering expertise for Shuttle modifications and supports the
Shuttle with approximatel} 1,000 NASA employees and 11,000 prime contractor em-
ployees. [Ref 21: p. 40]
1. Shuttle Payload Processing
Payloads for the Shuttle can be installed either horizontally or vertically.
Horizontal paxioads, such as Spacelab, are installed in the orbiter while it is still in the
Orbiter ProcCssing racility, prior to being mated to the External Tank and the Solid
Rocket Boosters. Vertical payloads are installed in the orbiter's payload bay after the
fully assembled Shuttle arrives at the launch pad. [Ref. 21: p. 40]
Pa,,ioad owners have five options for processing payloads, ranging from mini-
mum KSC in* ohemcnt, where the payload is ready for launch and can be installed in
the orbiter 2 to 50 dais before launch with no servicing, to maximum involvement,
where all flight experiments ant component hardware must be delivered up to a year
before launch for technicians to assemble, integrate and test. [Ref 21: p. 411
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2.Orbiter Processing
Orbiter processing constitutes the critical limit to the achievable flight. rate. For
example, refurbishing the orbiter Columbia for the second Shuttle flight consumed neari}
20O work dais. By late IMS, the turnaround time was reduced to 55 work~days. [Ref.
2 1: p. -III
In the Orbiter Processing Facility, 'N ASA contractors check and refurbish every%
major s~ stern in the o.-biter after each flight, including the avionics brakes, electrical
s; stemi, and ivindows. Th-C Inspect the Shuttle M ain Engines while completely replacing
the bearinrs tnd turbines. The 31 ,000 ceramnic tiles are indihidually inspected and re-
plz.cd as nceed.j Ani =.,-ifications that are needed to the orbiter are done at thistie-
[Ref. 21: '-. 4111
D. PROJECTED SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH CAPABiLITIES
In 19S1. NASA anticipated that ' the launch capability of the Space Shuttle by the
laze 19SI-Is wou'd be at least 21 missions per icar. NASA was concerned with total
kaunJ. capatbizt, -- that, is. both forei;,n and U.S. launchers as well as launch demand.
NAS .~~ce Iha teErpan -ria launch vehicle fiamily would be Capable of
10 to 12 mis sions pr. :ear b%~ the end Of the i9S(Is, which NASA equated to ;Iite Or six
Shuttle flicis. Soni-c ma-rket analysts in 19S1I projecd a launch demand in the vicinit%
of 35 to 50 ShuttleI~ equilalent flichts in the same timei frame. These figures pleased
NASA. If NASA could make the Shuttle attractive enough to potential Arane users,
maiests could be full Aor years. [Re. 22: p. 19j
.\ASAX studies indicated that a fifthi orbiter vehicle would be needed to reach and
sustain a launch rate of forvn flightS per -,car by the 1990's. NASA based the forty flight
proicezian on a single Shuttle being abIC to fl cighE to ten tomes jpcr year. [Ref. 22: p.
4-
Original NASA planning at the time of Shuttle program approval in 1972 envi-
sioned a five orbiter fleet supporting a projected mission model of 572 flights over a
twelve year period. This five orbiter fleet was to be made up of two DDT&E vehicles
and three production vehicles. During F- ' year 1977 budget preparations, OMB and
NASA. concluded that five orbiters were necessary but, due to funding constraints,
orbiter procurements were stretched out. By fiscal year 1979 budget hearings, the fifth
Orbiter was deferred. However, Congress conc!uded that the fifth Orbiter option should
be kept open and added funds for fifth Orbiter long lead items. [Ref. 23: pp. 1243-1244]
The fiscal year 1980 NASA budget request to the administration contained funds
for a fifth orbiter. These funds were deleted after program review within the adminis-
tration. [Ref. 23: p. 1244]
E. SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS) PRICING
The STS pricing structure is based on the concept of a firm-fixed price, designed to
encourage potential users to make an early commitment tc .' on the Space Shuttle. In
1979, the price for civil users was 518.0 million in 1975 dollars. (See Table 5.) This
figure was developed from cost data based on an anticipated manifest of 4S7 flights in
twelve N cars, and was predicated on recovery of all operations costs over the twelve year
period. [Ref. 20: p. 19]
Commercial and foreign users, except the European Space Agency (ESA) and
Canada, would be charged a fee of S4.3 million Lor the use of U.S. government facilities
and S270,000 for reflight insurance. [Ref. 20: p. 19]
The 1975 fixed price of S18.0 million was escalated to S25.8 million in fiscal year
1979 dollars, in accordance with Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation rates. Studies done
by NASA at that time (1979) indicated that by fiscal year 19S5, user charges would have
to be raised an additional 15 to 20%. [Ref. 20: p. 19]
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The price for a civil or foreign Shuttle launch prior to 1988 was S38 million plus fees
for capital facilities and insurance. (See Table 5.) This was set by NASA in 1977 to
recover all operating and production costs, including orbiters and related equipment (in
1982 dollars).
By the early 1980's, the market for launch services proved substantially smaller than
expected, forcing NASA to spread its operational costs over a smaller number of flights.
Accordingly in 19S2, when NASA revised the pricing policy for launches in the years
1986 through 198S, the price was significantly higher. But at S71 million, it still did not
recover all the operational costs of the Shuttle system.
The price for the period 1989 through 1991 -- S87 million per flight -- called for the
recovery of an a ci aged operational cost only. The user price remained significantly less
than that called for b- the original pricing policy which sought to recover all operating
costs. [Ref. 19: pp. 795-796]
Table 5. SPACE SHUTTLE PRICE / LAUNCH







NASA's plan in 1982 was to increase Shuttle prices to users by 1986. NASA's 1982
preliminary assessment of the price increase was on the order of 75% to 100% higher
than the established fixed price. The price increase was due to rising costs. NASA felt
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even though there was to be a considerable price increase, Shuttle prices Would remain
competitive within the launch market, [Ref. 24: p. 301]
During the fiscal year 1986 NASA authorization hearings, Shuttle funding require-
ments increased as a result of the net effect of:
e reduction in the amount of anticipated reimbursements, both from the DOD and
foreign and commercial users,
s and the savings which could be realized from changes of the flight mission schedule
and other cost reduction activities. [Ref. 19: p. 48]
NASA developed a cost model for the post-1988 period that permitted the estab-
lishment of prices for various users, depending on the pricing policy that applies. (See
Table 6.) The cost, based on a traffic model of 24 flights per year (two flights per
month), included all direct and indirect costs as well as allocation of institutional support
costs associated with Space Shuttle operations. Excluded were costs for Space Shuttle
research and development. [Ref. 19: p. 1330]
Table 6. SPACE SHUTTLE PRICE PER FLIGHT POST-1988 (1982, S
MILLION)
Fiscal Year 1989 Fiscal Year 1990 Fiscal Year 1991 Average
83.9 83.6 82.5 83.3
Launch costs in 1979 for DOD were fixed for six full fiscal years at S12.2 million in
1975 dollars. This price was intended to recover material and service costs and would
be adjusted to actual costs annually after the initial six year period. [Ref. 20: p. 16]
DOD Shuttle use prices in FY 1975 S for materials and services for all launches in
FY 1984 and FY 1985 was S16 million. DOD's rate was fixed at S29.8 million (FY 1975
S) per DOD Launch for FY 1986 through FY 1988. NASA felt that these prices pro-
vided the framework and conditions for appropriate reimbursements by DOD for STS
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flight charges. They N% ere de eloped in recognition of the major investment (Vandenburg
Air Force Base) DOD made in the STS program. [Ref. 25: p. 594]
In 1983, NASA stated that the amount of paid reservations, signed launch agree-
ments, joint endeavors, and number of customers making progress payments increased
significantly since the FMOF of April 1981. NASA expected this trend to continue as
the Shuttle proved itself operationally since launch agreements are generally made thret.
years or more prior to launch. [Ref. 23: p. 12451
However, to discourage people from cancelling their reservations on the Shuttle or
from considering other vehicles (Ariane, for example), NASA formulated cancellation
fees for users. [Ref. 23: pp. 1245-1246]
F. EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES (ELVS)
1. NASA's Atlas and Delta ELVs
By 19S0, after STS-5 and the Shuttle was considered operational, NASA was
only producing the Atlas-Centaur and Delta launch vehicles for users who previously
made reservations for those vehicles. (See Figure 5 for the Atlas and Delta configura-
tions.)
NASA terminated work on the Delta launch vehicle and eliminated the last six
Delta launches to conform with known launch requirements and in anticipation of STS
operations. Production of the Delta launch vehicle terminated in 19S3 although the ve-
hicle would be used through 1986 to accormmodate the launch of NOAA spacecraft.
[Ref. 23: p. 40]
Atlas-Centaur vehicles were being produced on firm customer requirements
onlh and its termination was slated for 1985. DOD planned to use the Atlas through
1987, with the last launch of an Atlas vehicle scheduled for early 1987. [Ref. 23: p. 40]
For the Delta and Atlas-Centaur program, a minimum on going rate of three
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Figure 5. Atlas and Delta Launch Vehicles
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reliability. Since the operational Shuttle would be able to accommodate requests for
launch services by all who requested, the maintenance and operation of the NASA ELVs
(Delta and Atlas,'Centaur) by the government solely as a backup to the Shuttle was
considered too costly and not justifiable. [Ref. 23" p. 1267]
NASA planned for the utilization of the Space Shuttle and phaseout of the U.S.
Governments' use of expendable lanch vehicles upon the completion of the final Delta
and Atlas-Centaur launches. [Ref. 23: p. 40]
With NASA using up their remaining ELVs by 1987 and no plans, short or
long-range, to produce any more ELVs, the Shuttle was rapidly becoming the U.S.'s sole
source to space. [Ref. 23: p. 55]
In July 1982, President Reagan announced the expanding of the private sector
investment and in, olvement in ci il space and space related activities as a basic goal of
U.S. space policy. Vith respect to ELVs, the announcement was more specific, stating
that ELV operations should be continued b3 the U.S. Government until the capabilities
of the STS are sufficient to meet its needs. Beyond this time frame (early 1987) the
policy did not endorse or prohibit the turnover of ELV production to the private sector.
[Ref. 23: p. 1267]
Since the administration considered the Space Shuttle as the primary access to
space. e er- step was taken to ensure the Shuttle was fully utilized. Operating the
Shuttle in a robust manner was the goal of NASA, and in doing so NASA believed ro-
bust operations would bolster the confidence of potential customers in the long-term
viability of the Shuttle. [Ref. 23: p. 126S]
2. Department of Defense and Assured Access to Space
The DOD was trying to maintain an assured access to space through main-
taining ELV capability. As Secretary of the Air Force Edward Aldridge stated before
Congress during the NASA 1985 Authorization Hearings:
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The DOD has a valid requirement for an assured launch capability which
is a function of satisfying two specific requirements: The need for complementary
launch systcms to hedge against unforseen technical and operational problems and
the need for a launch system suited for operations and conflict situations.
Existing defense space launch planning specifies that DOD will rely on four
unique, manned orbiters for primary access to space for all national security space
systems. DOD is concerned that this may not represent an assured, flexible and
responsive access to space.
Whie the DOD is fully committed to the STS, ,total reliance upon the STS
for sole access to space in view of the technical and operati6nal uncertainties could
represent all unacceptable national security risk. DOD believes that a complemen,
tary system is necessary to provide high confidence of accessto space. [Ref. 25: pp.
663-664]
3. Titan IV, the Dedicated DOD Launch Vehicle
Consistent with DOD's position as well as the Presidents space policy speech
endorsing a flexible and robust U.S. launch posture, DOD started studying the use of
commercially procured ELVs to meet its requirements for improving its assured launch
capabilities. [Ref. 25: p. 6651
Because of the Air Force's concern with assured access to space, the adminis-
tration proposed and-the Congress approved new capacity for space transportation in a
1986 supplemental appropriation. The Titan IV ELV became the dedicated DOD
launch ,ehicle. (See Figure 6 for the Titan IV configuration.) The procurement of
Titan iV expendable launch Nehicles was increased from 10 vehicles to 23 over the 1986
to 1991 time period. In addition, a new ELV program, the Medium Launch Vehicle
(MLV) (the Delta II). was approved to launch the DOD Global Positioning Satellite
(GPS) constellation. [Ref. 26: pp. xi-xii]
G. THE PRICING PROBLEM
From the beginning, NASA proposed low user prices for the Space Shuttle. For
example, NASA's pricing policy for 1986 through 1988 was not based on full cost re-
cover3, on aerage annual cost recover,%, on average per launch recovery, or on any










7.Segment SFUM - '.
Figure 6. The Titan IV DOD Launch Vehicle
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According to NASA's internal analyses, the projected "out-of-pocket" costs for a
full Shuttle launch in 1986-88 would be on average S71 million in 1982 dollars. NASA
charged as its launch price this S71 million with DOD charged slightly less. [Ref. 24: p.
8271
But, as economist P. K. Salin stated before the Congress during the 1985 authori-
zation hearings, NASA's process was questionable:
NASA attempted to exclude many types of Shuttle-related costs from its pricing
calculations. NASA also attempted to exclude large parts of the total annual cost
for e'en the 'included' cost categories. For what small costs were left, NASA ap-
plied analytic methods almost guaranteed to result in cost underestimation. It av-
eraged cost estimates from later years with cost estimates from earlier years, and
then based its prices on the calculated average. Since NASA's analysts are hoping
Shuttle costs will drop dramatically during the 1980's the resulting average cost es-
timate used as the basis of NASA's proposed pricing policy is very low. [Ref. 24:
p. 8 41]
In 19S4 the Space Shuttle was already being regarded as much more expensive to
operate than originally planned in 1971. The Shuttle was far more expensive for
laun.hiqg cnununications satellites to geostationary orbits than competing vehicles
such as Delta, Atlas Centaur, or Ariane. [Ref. 24: p. 836]
The Shuttle was uncompetitive in the launching business primarily due to the
unaN oidabl% heav% costs associated with supporting manned capability, as well as heavy
costs associated uith integrating multiple payloads on each mission. Because of these
una% oidable extra costs, the Space Shuttle was destined to be more costly to operate for
launching satellites than a more specialized ELV. [Ref. 24: p. 836]
NASA's data confirmed various economists findings of the Shuttle program. The
data indicated that every Shuttle launched during the period 1982 through 1988 would
cost NASA more than 5200 million dollars but would be priced below SIO million in
accordance with Shuttle pricing policy. [Ref. 24: pp. 850-8521
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1. Pricing Policy
NASA's pricing policy for the Shuttle was controversial, and the agency was
criticized for trying to run the Shuttle program as a business. As NASA's quest for in-
creased launch frequency continued, disagreement arose on how much of the operational
costs NASA should be allowed to recover and what was a reasonable goal for the
number of flights per year, since more flights, meant a larger base over which fixed costs
could be spread.
Over the years, the goals of reducing prices and recovering costs came increas-
ingl into conflict. NASA increased the base price charged to Shuttle users, but never
enough to fully reco'er its increasing operational costs. By 1986 the user price was S71
million per flight (1982 dollars) for launches, a figure meant to recover average operating
costs if 24 flights per year could be achieved. [Ref. 2S: p. 2]
As a result, e~er Shuttle launched prior to 1989, carrying mainly commercial
communications satellites, resulted in an excess operational cost of around SI00 million
subsidized by the U.S. Government. By contrast, the equivalent payload could be
launched on existing Deltas or Atlas.Centaurs for a cost of around SI00 million with
no subsidies. (Ref. 24: p. 836]
Critics pointed out that as a result of NASA's pricing policy the more cost ef-
fective ELV's N ere being subjected to unfair competition by a taxpayer-subsidized
Shuttle. [Ref. 24: p. 8361
However, the majority of space users enjoyed the Space Shuttle's lower prices
and did not want to see NASA raise the price of a Shuttle launch. During the 1986
NASA Authorization hearings before the Congress, Robert K. Roney, Vice President
of Hughes Aircraft Compan3 voi,ed the comnunication satellite manufacturer's con-
cerns with Space Shuttle prices. Mr. Roney felt that Shuttle pricing should be kept
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reasonable and NASA should onl) seek to recover the costs associated with that mission
only:
Much of the cost of operating the Shuttle stems from its status as a manned flight
vehicle. I ha e detected no perception among communications operators of any
operational ad% antage from the special characteristics of the Shuttle. In fact, on the
whole, the operational problems of using the Shuttle have a negative appeal relative
to the convenience of a dedicated expendable vehicle. So it is unfair to charge any
of the cost of maintaining the manned space flight program for the service of simply
transporting a payload to orbit. [Ref. 19: p. 395]
Another advocate of the "out-of-pocket" Shuttle pricing approach was Charles
A. Ordahl, Vice President of the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company. In a
statement for the 1986 NASA Authorization Hearings he said:
The Shuttle ... should be used to foster and encourage space commercial invest-
ments. This can be achieved through a policy of additive cost pricing in which
commercial customers are charged all out of pocket costs incurred on their behalf
but no allocated share of the fixed or capacity costs of the Shuttle system. This
could provide a Shuttle price of less than the current S71 million FY 1986 - 1988
priLe. Such pricing will place Shuttle in a position to win competitions with Ariane,
and with each win, achievement of the economic benefit of increased shuttle
launches and more Shuttle related commercial business retained in the United
States. [Ref. 19: p. 411)
Many commercial users of the Shuttle were frightened by the trend to raise
Shuttle launch prices. They feared the following scenario:
" The Shuttle launch price is raised to obtain total operational cost recovery and to
be a fair competitor for cormnercial ELVs.
* The cormmercial ELV industry is born.
" The European Space Agency's Ariane, with subsidies, keeps its prices below that
of the U.S. Shuttle and ELVs.
" The U.S. ELV market share is not sufficient to provide a return on investment and
within a year or two commercial companies abandon their effort.
* The commercial payloads are committed to Ariane at a lower price than Shuttle.
* The Shuttle is maintained as a national asset and is more expensive to maintain due
to lack of satellite paxloads and the withdrawal of potential new space applications.
But some observers felt no remorse for the taxpayers subsidizing access to space
by the Shuttle. They felt that the government had many times throughout history sub-
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sidized profit making ventures especially in opening new frontiers such as the transcon-
tinental railroad or civilian airport and air traffic control system. [Ref. 19: p. 4181
2. Operational Shuttle in Question
In 1984, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel expressed concern and made
recommendations concerning NASA's "operational" Space Shuttle program. For ex-
ample, the panel warned against the heavy launch processing burden associated with
each mission. The) cautioned NASA management to avoid advertising the Shuttle as
being "operational" in the airline sense "when it clearly wasn't." In the panel's opinion
such routine operations would not be achieved for 5 to 10 years and NASA should focus
on improving the Shuttle's reliability, maintainability, and safety. [Ref. 29: p. 219]
The panel expressed the view that NASA's goal of 18 to 24 flights per year was
not within reach and that 12 to 15 per year was the most NASA could hope to achieve.
The panel belie% ed that an "operational" Space Shuttle program was still many years in
the future. [lRcf. 29: p. 2191
Additionally, the panel noted that "... continuing use of the term 'operational'
simplh compounds the unique management challenge of guiding the STS through this
period of 'de elopmental evolution.'" The panel stressed the importance of upgrading
the safety and reliability of man of the Space Shuttle's critical systems and of recog-
nizing that the continuing process of change and improvement would require the disci-




In 1986 the United States was plagued by a series of launch disasters:
* the Challenger exploded shortly after lift-off killing its crew of seven and destroying
its cargo;
" a Titan 34-D accident in April destroyed a military satellite, following an accident
the preceding August involving an identical launcher and similar satellite;
" a Delta rocket, with a NOAA weather satellite aboard, was destroyed followiing
launch failure.
The Chat',enger accident in January 1986 had an enormous effect on the U.S. access
to space.
A. THE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
Flight of the Space Shuttle Challengcr on mission 51-L began at 11:3S a.m. Eastern
Standard Time on Januar' 2S, 19S6. It ended 73 seconds later in an explosive burn of
hidrogCen and oxygen propellants that destroyed the External Tank and exposed the
Orbiter to severe aerodi namic loads that caused complete structural breakup. All ez.en
cre, members perished. The two Solid Rocket Boosters flew out of the fireball and were
destroyed b% the Air Force Range Safety Officer 10 seconds after launch. 'Ref 11 p.
1 91
Just after liftoff. photographic data showed a strong puff of grey smoke spurting
from the %icini' of the aft field joint on the right SRB. Computer graphic analysis of
th, fim indicated the smoke came from the aft field joint of the right SRB. This portion
of the SRB faced the External Tank. Smoke streaming from the joint indicated there
%%as not complete sealing action within the joint. [Ref. 1: p. 191 (See Figure 7 for the
location of the leak.)
More distincti'e puffb of increasingly blacker smoke were recorded seconds after
liftoff, The black color and dense composition of the smoke puffs suggested that the
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grease, joint insulation, and rubber 0-rings in the joint seal were being burned and
eroded by the hot propellant gases. [ Ref. 11: pp. 19-20]
Both the Shuttle Main Engines and the Solid Rocket Boosters operated at reduced
thrust approaching and passing through the area of maximumn dynamic pressure. Main
engines were thrh.,tled up to 104 percent thrust and the SRBs were increasing their thrust
when the first flickering flame appeared on the right SRB in the area of the aft field joint.
At about the same time, telemetry data showed a pressure differential between the
chamber pressures of the right and left SRB. The right SRB chamber pressure was
lower, confirming! the growinga leak in the area of the field joint. (Ref. 11: p. 201
A swirling flame from the righit SRB breached the External Tank was 65 seconds
into the flight, apparent b,, an abrupt change in the shape and color of the right SRB
plumie. This indicated mixing with the leaking hydrogen of tile Extern 1 Tank an~d the
SRB pI kan. Te',en-esr' also inicateds a leak in the ET. Within milliseconds of breaching
the ET. a bricht sustainct!"clow dc~eloped on the black-tiled underside of the Orbiter
between it and thec ET. (Ref. 11: p. '-'I]
Beginning at about 72 seconds. a series of rapidly occurring events terminated the
flieght:
* AXt -ab:,jt 72.22 secenis. the lower strut linkine the SRB and the ET wtas severed
Pro-., E',. weakened ET permingm Elhe rieht SRB to rotate around tile upper at-
tacnient strut.
" At 73.124 seconds structural Cfilure of the ET was signified by the white vapor
bloomingi from the side of the ET bottcm domec.
* When the entire art portion of the ET dropped away. massiv-e aniounts of liquid
hvdroee-n caused a sudden forwvard thrust of I.S million pounds.
" At about the same timec the rotating right SRB impacted the remaining ET strL.c-
ture. (Res' 11: pp. 2'i-211
At this poi:~t of thle Erajectory. traveling almost miach 2 at an altitude of 4600feet,
the Ch;7tc %%as toteall: en" elope.d in the explosive burn. Thc Orbiter. under severe
SRM LEAK
LOCATION
Figure 7. The Leak Location in the Solid Rocket Booster
aerodxnamic loads, broke into several large sections which emerged from the fireball.
[Ref 11: p. 211
-B. CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT
The consensus of the Presidentially appointed Rogers Commission, tasked with in-
vestigating the accident, was the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by a
failuie in the joint bftween the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Booster.
SpecificallK, the failure was the destruction of the seals intended to prevent hot gases
from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor. The ev-
idence aszeribled b3 the Rogers Commission indicated no other element of the Space
Shuttle system contributed to the failure. [Ref. 30: p. 6]
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In addition to the failure of the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor, the
Commission found other contributing factors to the Shuttle Challenger accident.
1. O-ring Temperature
Within the joint, there are various components that collectively contribute to
the sealing process and keep hot combustion gases from escaping. A major component
is the O-ring, and 0-ring performance is directly related to its temperature. On previous
Shuttle flights with ambient temperatures lower than 61 degrees fahrenheit, the O-rings
showed greater than normal erosion. The ambient temperature on the day of the
Challenger launch v as 36 degrees fahrenheit. Because of this cold temperature (coldest
Shuttle launch exer attempted) the 0-rings lost their resiliency and were unable to seal
the joint properly. [Ref. 30: p. 33, Ref. 11: pp. 70-71]
2. "Flawed Decision Process"
In addition to the technical problems, the Commission also found a "flawed
decision process" within NASA, as well as between NASA and its contractors. That is,
the decision to launch the Challenger was wrong. Those who made the decision to
launch were una% are of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings in the
joint and %%eie unaN~arc of the i~rittcn recommendation of the SRB contractor (Morton
Thiokol) ad'ising against a launch at temperatures below 53 degrees fahrenheit. [Ref.
30: p. 351
Also discovered during the investigation was that the design of the SRB field
joint was faulty from its inception. The problem increased as both NASA and Morton
Thiokol management failed to recognize the problem; once recognized, they failed to fix
the problem; and finally theN treated the problem as an acceptable flight risk. [Ref. 30:
pp. 36-37]
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3. Pressures on the System
With the 1982 completion of the orbital test flight series, NASA began a
planned acceleiation of the Space Shuttle launch schedule. In 1985, NASA published a
projection calling for an annual rate of 24 flights by 1990. Long before the Challenger
accident, however, it was clear that even two flights per month was overly ambitious.
[Ref. 11: p. 164]
In establishing the schedule, NASA did not provide adequate resources for at-
tainment. As a result, the capabilities of the system were strained even by the modest
nine mission rate of 1985. The Commission found that NASA would not have accom-
plished the 15 scheduled flights for 1986. [Ref 30: p. 39]
The Rogers Commission found that with respect to flight rate pressures:
* The capabilities of the Shuttle System were stretched to the limit to support the
flight rate.
* The Shuttle program made a conscious decision to postpone spare parts procure-
ments in favor of budget items of perceived higher priority. Lack of spare parts
would have limited flight operations in 1986.
* Stated cargo manifest policies were not enforced. Numerous late manifest changes
%iere made to both major pa3loads and minor payloads, throughout the Shuttle
program. [Ref. 30: pp. 39-40]
Flight rate pressures developed because of the need to meet customer commit-
ments, Nshich translated into a requirement to launch at a high rate and to launch them
on time. NASA managers had forgotten that even though the Shuttle system flew 24
times prior to the accident, the program could still be considered to be in a research and
development phase. [Ref 11: p. 165]
4. Rogers Commission Recommendations
The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger accident made
recommendations to return the Shuttle System to a safe flight status. They included:
* redesigning the Solid Rocket Motor joint,
* restructuring NASA management,
o holding critical flight readiness reviews,
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* establishing an effective safety organization,
" improving communications,
" improving landing safety,
o designing a launch abort/crew escape capability,
" and incorporating maintenance safeguards. [Ref. I1: pp. 198-201]
Also the commission recommended establishing a more realistic flight schedule
for the Shuttle System to meet as well as establishing other launch capabilities:
The nation's reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created
relentless pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate. Such reliance on a single
launch capability should be ax oided in the future. NASA must establish a flight rate
that is consistent with its resources. A firm payload assignment policy should be
established. [Ref. 11: p. 2011
C. RAMIFICATIONS OF CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
Before the Challcnger accident, NASA thought the late 1980's would see the real-
ization of the Shuttle's promise. NASA felt the anticipated capacity of 24 flights per
year was attainable. The Shuttle s, stem was declared operational and considered the
U.S. workhorse in deploying satellites.
NASA officials anticipated the realization of cost-effective Shuttle operations re-
warding the entire s,,ace program. From a budgetary standpoint, commercial launches
provided NASA rexenues, as would servicing DOD launch requirements. These reven-
ues would not only enable NASA to offset some of the high fixed costs of operating the
Shuttle, but also would allow NASA to conduct a vigorous space science program as
well as proceed with the space station. [Ref. 27: p. 31
1. President Reagan Restructures Space Policy
Following the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, President Reagan restructured
the United States space policy primarily in two areas. First, the Space Shuttle would
no longer carry co- -nercial communications satellites to space. Secondly, NASA was
given permissi,,n procure a fourth Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle. [Ref. 29: p. 323)
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The administration's decision to remove commercial communication satellite
traffic from the Shuttle had immediate budgetary ramifications to NASA. The user fees
generated by commercial Shuttle launches were intended to create a source -of revenue
for NASA in the future. [Ref. 27: p. 3]
In 1986, the future NASA budget outlook was uncertain. Reduced DOD
transfers through reduced DOD Shuttle use, lower commercial revenues through elimi-
nation of commercial communication satellite traffic, and new costs to improve Shuttle
safety all contributed to the Shuttle no longer being considered the "routine access to
space." [Ref. 27: p. 3]
NASA is presently building a new replacement Orbiter for the Challenger. At
President Reagan's request, Congress has full- funded the project based on the belief
that the new Orbiter is essential to the planned shuttle flight buildup for the space sta-
tion. [Ref. 311
Designated the Endeavor (OV-105), the Orbiter is scheduled to be delivered in
Ma% 1991 ;ith the initial launch targeted for early 1992. The Endeavor will incorporate
improvements such as:
* A drag chute that will allow for contingency abort landings on relatively short
rur-'ays, also reducing rollout and brakeltire loads.
* A modesigned disconnect between the External Tank and the Main Engines.
* A new APU controller.
* A solid state star tracker navigation system.
* Improved nose wheel steering. [Ref. 31]
2. Shuttle to ELV Transfer
By the Summer of 1986, NASA estimated that through FY 1992 approximately
43 percent of scheduled payloads could be transferred from the Shuttle and flown on
ELNs, if ELVs were available. NASA recognized there would be some additional costs
in spacecraft modification and possible significant cost to modify the current ELV sys-
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tems to accommodate these spacecraft. Additionally, at this time NASA's Delta and
Atlas, Centaur vehicles, which would accommodate most of the payloads, were out of
production. New production of the Delta and Atlas,'Centaur vehicles would require 24
to 36 months from contract go-ahead before new delivery could begin. NASA approxi-
mated 57 percent of Shuttle pa loads were Shuttle dependent or would be too expensive
to transfer to ELVs. [Ref. 31: p. 669]
If Expendable Launch Vehicles had been available after the accident, the 1986
estimated prices of ELVs are in Table 7.
Table 7. 1986 ELV COSTS
Vehicle Estimated Cost, 1986
Titan I 550.0 Million
Titan Ill S142.0 Million
Titan IV S171.0 Million
Delta 538.0 Million
Delta 1I S38.0 Million
Atlas-F 515.0 Million
Atlas-1-1 j 540.0 Million
3. Vandenburg Shuttle Launch Complex
Vandenburg Air Force Base in California is the West Coast equivalent of the
Kennedy Space Center, with numerous launch pads available. Though Vandenburg is
run by the Air Force, both military and civilian payloads are launched from it.
After in esting approximately seven years and S3.3 billion on research, devel-
opment, construction, and testing, the Air Force announced on 31 July 19S6, that it was
placing the Vandenburg Shuttle Complex in "caretaker" status (maintaining the equip-
ment but closing the complex) until 1992. The decision was preceded by several years
of concern with facility cost ox er-runs, safety issues, and delay s in commencing oper-
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ations at the site. Following the loss of the Challenger, both NASA and DOD ques-
tioned the cost-effectiveness of operating two launch sites with only t'--,e Orbiters. The
Air Force commander in carge of the Shuttle test facility at "Vandenburg commented
that launch of the Shuttle from Vandenburg is now being considered as backup to ELVs.
Though no Shuttle flights are planned from the Vandenburg facility, the Air Force will
"protect the capability" for a Shuttle Launch in 1992. [Ref. 32: p. 16]
D. EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE/MIXED FLEET
The National Space Policy that resulted from President Reagan's speech in July of
1982 directed that U.S. goNernment payloads, including DOD payloads, would be tran-
sitioned from ELVs to the Space Shuttle. By the Challenger accident in January 1986,
this transition was nearly complete. Most payloads were configured for the Space
Shuttle only and no new U.S. government ELVs were being built. [Ref. 33]
The projected increase of Shuttle flights and the associated decrease in ELV
launches prior to the Challenger accident is evident in Table 8 and Table 9.
Table 8. SHUTTLE MANIFEST PRIOR TO CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
FY FY TFY FY FY
86 87 188 89 90
Commercial 4.8 1.9 2.6 5.3 5.2
DOD 3.0 5.7 9.3 9.8 8.4
NASA 6.2 8.7 6.1 7.3 9.5
Opportunity -- 0.7 -- 1.6 0.9
Total Flights 14 17 18 24 24
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Table 9. ELV SCHEDULE PRIOR TO CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
FY FY FY FY FY
86 87 88 89 90
Scout 2 4 2 2 2
Delta 2 2 0 0 -0
Atlas.'Centaur .1 2 0 0 0
Atlas E'F 1 1 1 i 1
Total Flights 6 9 3 3 3
After the accident, NASA felt the United States should re-examine its policy on
space transportation and move toward a mixed fleet concept versus the 1982 policy of
ha~ing the Shuttle as the sole source to space. Although NASA feels the Shuttle, with
its redundancy and unique man rated capability, is a valuable national resource that can
be uscd for practically all space transportation needs, NASA admitted a reassessment
of policy is required. [Ref. 35: p. 632]
A major NASA stud% in December 1986 advocated a mixed fleet of launch vehicles.
The study coxered a period from 1988 to 1995 and concluded that a mixed fleet com-
posed of the Shuttle and ELVs is necessary to assure access to space. [Ref. 36: p. 18]
NASA belie'es a mixed fleet approach will provide the flexibility and options in effec-
tively executing space transportation opcrations. [Ref 35: p. 6321]
The mixed fleet program was initiated in fiscal year 1987. The study recommended
that U.S. civil government's spacecraft be launched using a balance of ELVs and STS
to provide increased access to space, to assure continuity of space operations, and to
enhance mission flexibility. [Ref. 37: p. 911
In December of 1986, the U.S. Space Launch Strategy (NSDD 254) mandated the
reconstitution of launch assets using a mixed fleet of ELVs and the Space Shuttle. The
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strateg) included a balanced mix of the Space Shuttle and ELVs, utilization .of the Space
Shuttle principall) for missions requiring its unique capabilities, and maintain a dual
compatibility for critical launches. [Ref 34]
NASA revised its space flight manifest plans for civil government payloads based
on the mixed fleet concept. [Ref. 37: p. 91)
NASA believes the ELV family of vehicles (Titan, Atlas, and Delta) along with the
Shuttle will satisfy the needs of the nation's civil space program in the near future.
These ELY launch services are procured competitively from the private sector. [Ref.
36: p. 21]
Since NASA is no longer responsible for the production and maintenance of ELVs,
the National Space Policy of 19SS specified directives on ELV commercialization:
* NASA is to procure ELV launch services directly from the private sector or from
the Department of Defense.
The U.S. government is to facilitate private sector access to U.S. launch facilities
and services. [Ref. 34]
I. Criteria for a Shuttle Launch
In response to the mixed fleet study, NASA established a flight assignment
board in 1989 to manifest payloads on the Shuttle or ELVs. The criteria now established
for a Space Shuttle launch are:
* The mission or payload requires a manned presence.
* The mission or payload requires the unique capabilities of the Space Shuttle.
* Other compelling circumstances for the Shuttle exist (e.g., foreign policy or na-
tional security). [Ref. 341
E. LAUNCH DEMAND
The Challenger accident catalyzed reconsideration of U.S. space transportation pol-
icy. The polic% debate focused on underlying questions concerning the capacity of the
Shuttle S stem, the nation's future demand for launch services, and the roles of the
public and private sectors in meeting launch demand. [Ref. 27: p. xii]
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According to NASA, the market traditionally served by U.S. launch capability is
projected to require the equivalent of 30 Shuttle flights annually in the early 1990s --
roughly four times the level of actual average launch activity experienced from 1970 to
1985. [Ref. 26: p. 21
Using the historical record as a guide, NASA, DOD, and government contractors
have consistently over-estimated launch demand.
Since the Challenger accident, estimated flight rates became increasingly conserva-
tive. With a four Orbiter fleet NASA is projecting a flight rate of 16 flights per year
while the National Research Council (NRC) is projecting 12 flights per year. NASA and
the NRC agree that four flights per year per Orbiter is achievable. The NRC, however,
states that with a four Orbiter fleet only three of the four Orbiters will be "manifestable."
This judgment is based upon unpredictable occurrences that in effect would remove one
of the four Orbiters from use. On the other hand, the NASA projection is based on
analy sis and experience that NASA feels supports the view that each of the orbiters may
fly four times a year. [Ref. 37: p. 15, Ref. 35: p. 181
1. Shuttle Flight Equivalent
The Shutile Flight Equivalent is now used as the unit of measure for launch de-
mand. While the shuttle flight equivalent is precise enough to provide a reasonably ac-
curate representation of the level of launch activity, it is defined with reference to a
specific set of parameters that all Shuttle launches, past or projected, conform to:
Shuttle Flight Equhalent: An orbiter capable of carrying 65,000 pounds, launched with
a 50.000 pound load from Kennedy Space Center to a low earth orbit of
2S.5 degrees, 160 nautical miles above the earth. [Ref. 26: p. 6]
Table 10 is a comparison of historic launch vehicles and their corresponding
Shuttle Equivalent.
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Table 10. HISTORIC ELVS AND SHUTTLE EQUIVALENT
Launch Vehicle Shuttle Equivalent
Saturn I 0.6
Titan I1 0.5 to 0.7
Titan Agena 0.33
Atlas EF 0.25
Delta 0.15 to 0.21
Atlas Centaur 0.33
Scout 0.125
2. Official Forecasted Launch Demand
The Congressional Budget Office defines space launch demand as:
Space Launch Demand: Pailoads that arc readx to- be integrated with launch vehicles
and that have enough financing, public or private, to cover launch costs.
The unit of measurement of space launch demand is Shuttle Equivalents.
[Ref. 261
Before the Challcnge) accident, NASA officials anticipated impressive growth in
traditional satellite deplornment and also in new kinds of activity, such as space con-
struction, scricing orbital spacecraft, and round-trip scientific experimentation. Ac-
cording to this "official Nicw," the group of users traditionally served by U.S. space
transportation would rapidl) expand their requirements from about 7.5 Shuttle flight
equixalents annuall in the first half of the 19SOs to almost 30 equivalents annually
throughout the 1990s. [Ref. 26: p. 7]
According to DOD and NASA projections, all types of space users will increase
their launch demands. DOD is projected to increase three times over the shuttle equiv-
alents thex required in the early 190s. This increase will stem from the deployment of
the Global Positioning System (GPS) and MILSTAR, an advanced communication
system. as well as SDI tests and existing system upgrades.
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Additionally, NASA's support of the Space Station will increase their share of
shuttle equivalent flights dramatically, as much as 10 flights per year by the first half of
the 1990s while sustaining a rate of 11 shuttle equivalents per year by the end of the
1990s. [Ref. 26: p. 9]
Table II. U.S. SPACE LAUNCHES 1970 TO 1985


















3. Launch Activity: 1970-1985
An examination of historic U.S. launches indicates a gradual increase in laun,h
demand. (See Table 11.) From 1970 through 1985, the launch market traditionally
served by the United States averaged 7.5 equihalent Shuttle flights per year. From 1970
to 1985, DOD launches alone accounted for an average of 45 percent of the payloads
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flown on U.S. systems. During the same period, NASA and NOAA accounted for an-
other 25-percent of the spacecraft launched by the United States. [Ref. 26: pp. 12-13]
4. Over-Estimation of Launch Demand
Prexious projections of launch demand have over-estimated actual demand in
both the immediate future (one to three years), and the longer term (beyond three years).
The NASA launch forecast for 1985 is an example of this:
* In 1979, 44 Shuttle equivalents were projected by NASA for 1985, but this estimate
dropped to only 39 flights in the 1980 projection for 1985, and 22 flights in the 1983
projection. [Ref. 26: p. 101
The majority of the decline in the projections between 1979 and 1983 for 1985 re-
sulted from over-estimation of demand.
An earli 19S5 projection of flights for that same year was 14 Shuttle flight equiv-
alents, much closer to the actual 12 shuttle equivalents of 1985 (including ELVs).
[Ref. 26: p. 101
There are three reasons that drive the consistent over-estimation of launch de-
mand:
* In rcponding to projection surveys, potential launch service users systematically
under-estimate the technical, market, and budgetary constraints that tend to force
actual space transportation demand below planned demand.
* Military launch requirements are oer-estimated because DOD assumes that sat-
ellite life times will be far shorter than actual experience indicates.
* NASA's projections of its own needs, particularly when the Shuttle system is con-
cerned. are often overstated because NASA is assumes that planned capacity will
be filled by budget-supported demand when. in fact, the Congress regularly ap-
proves lower appropriations than requested by 'NASA. [Ref. 26: p. 1II
F. SPACE SHUTTLE RETURNS TO FLIGHT
In September of 198S, the Space Shuttle Discover" was launched, returning the
Space Shuttle fleet back to space. NASA conducted thorough reviews of the Shuttle
program and essential!y met all the recommendations of the Rogers Commission. The
Space Shuttle has new, redesigned, and safer solid rocket boosters that have been ex-
tensicly tested. But NASA points out that the return-to-flight effort will not be fully
complete until a sustained flight rate is achieved. [Ref. 301
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The Shuttle will now undergo continuous improvements. The reasons for continued
change is that NASA wants a safer, higher pcrforming! Shuttle that is less expensive to
operate through cost reductions. Additionall}, the Shuttle is built around early 1970
technolog}, which is large13 obsolete. NASA intends to upgrade the flight computers
b increasing processing speed, doubling the memory, and reducing the size and weight.
The projected first flight of a Shuttle with the upgraded comiputer is planned for early
1991. [Ref. 30]
Additional impro~ ements to the Shuttle will include a new auxiliary power unit
(APU) tuith increased lie and reduced turnaround time. Also a new carbon brak~e wvas
developed to increase p-erformance and safet ma rgins and was flow.n on STS-31I in April
1990. (Ref. 301
1. Post Challenger Accident Shuttle Fiight Record
The fligts per vehicle since thte Shuttle's return to flight is in T able 12.
Table U-. FLIGHTS PER SHTT1LE VEHICLE SINCE ACCIDEN\T
Vehlicle Minumber oi Fni-1itS
Columsbia OV-1l"- 22
lDi,-covery OV- Itb j 4
The numa'ber of Shuttle lights by year since the return of the Shuttle flece to
filicht in Semlenber ISS were one fliiht in FY 19SS, fou~r flights in IT 19s9. and ive
fliirhts in Fy Igo;.
Since the Vandenbure Launch Facility is in a -mothball" status. \ASA revised
the Shuztic Idtnumbenire s~:ern to the ori~inai method of irndicating only the w_-
mnrca se-auen.- cof flichlts. The Shuttle mission histor* since the Chalflezcr accident is
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in Table 13.
Table 13. SPACE SHUTTLE MISSIG HISTORY (POST CHALLENGER AC-
CIDENT)
Flight Date Vehicle Payload
Number Launched
STS-26 9 Sep 88 Discovery NASA Relay satellite
STS-27 2 Jan 88 Atlantis DOD mission
STS-28 8 Aug 89 Columbia DOD mission
STS-29 13 Mar 89 Discovery NASA relay satellite
STS-30 4 May 89 Atlanis Magellan space probe
STS-31 IS Apr 90 Disco'cry Hubble Space Telescope
STS-32 9 Jan 90 Columbia Space science payloads
STS-33 22 Nov 89 ')iscovery DOD mission
STS-34 IS Oct 89 ' itlans Galileo space probe
2. Projected Space Shuttle Flights
In .January 1990, NASA provided a schedule for future Space Shuttle flights of
which a portion is presented in 'rable 14.
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Table 14. PROJECTED SPACE SHUTITLE FLIGHTS (AS OF JAN. 1990)
Flight Date Vehicle Primary Payload-IN umber
STS-35 9 May 90 Columbia Astronomy and X-Ray Telescope
STS-36 22 Feb. 90 Atlantis DOD Mission __________
STS-3 7 1 Nov 90 Atlantis Gamma Ray Observatory
STS-38 9 Jul 90 Atlantis DOD Mission
STS-40 29 Aug 90 Columbia Space Life Sciences
STS-41 5 Oct 90 Discomer International Solar Polar Mission
STS-42 12 Dec 90 Columbia International Microgravity Lab
STS-43 131 Jan 91 Discoveryv Tracking and Data Relay Sat.
STS-44 4 Mar 91 Ailantis DOD Mission
STS-45 4 Apr 91 IColumbia Atmospheric Lab for Applications and
________________________________________ _ _ _ S c ie n ce________ IS 
ST"S-46 16 M~ay 91 Discovciy European Retrievable Carrier
S T S-'?7 17 Jun 91 Atlaniis Spacelab
STS-4S 22 Aug 91 Discoveiy Upper Atmospheric Research Sat.
STS-49 30 Sep 91 Atilantis Starlab
STS-50 ]5 Dec 91 Discovery Laser Geodynamrics Sat.
STS-51 23 Jan 92 j tlantis Infrared Background Signature Survey
S T S-52 113 Feb 92 Endeavor Geostar
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VI. PROPOSED HEAVY LAUNCH SYSTEMS
A. NATIONAL SECURITY LAUNCH STRATEGY (NSDD-144)
On 25 Februar. 19S5, President Reagan signed the National Security Decision Di-
rective (NSDD-144) entitled "National Security Launch Strategy," which initiated a
study to look at the future development of a second-generation space transportation
system. The National Security Launch Strategy reaffirmed that the Space Shuttle would
continue to be the primary space launch system for the Up.ited States. [Ref. 1: p. 1]
Additionally, with regard to the future, the Directive specified:
DOD and NASA will jointly study the develcpment of a. second-generation space
transportation system -- making use of manned and unmanned systems to meet the
requirements of all users. A full range of options will be studied, including shuttle-
derived technologies and others. [Ref. 1: p. I]
B. FINDINGS OF THE JOINT DOD/NASA NATIONAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION STUDY
The Joint DOD NASA team queried both government and industry pezsonnel in-
N olhed in the acquisition and operation of current launch systems. The information
gathered will aid in the definition and evaluation of future space transportation systems
and policies. Table 15 surmnarizes what the joint DOD , NASA team found concerning
current launch systemns as vell as the considerations for future space transportation
systems. [Ref. 3S, Ref. 1]
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Table 15. FINDINGS OF THE JOINT DOD/NASA TASK TEAM
Current Launch Systems
The current systems were originally designed to meet space mission planning models
which have never fully materialized.
Funding limitations during the de elopment phases forced compromises Which in-
hibited existing national launch systems from realizing the full potential for cost-
effective operations.
The U.S. has neither funded nor maintained a robust space launch system that allows
for improx ement of the operational effectiveness of the existing national launch sys-
tems.
The U.S. launch industrial base cannot rapidly react to changing space mission re-
quirements and or adversity.
A complementarx launch strategy must be inherent in the national space policy to
increase the probability of continuous access tp space.
Space transportation costs are substantially driven by both launch systems and
spacecraft designs which require man-pow er intersixe, technically complex, and
high-cost integration efforts.
The existing Space Shuttle and ELs have.relatively high operating costs when
compared to that achiexable in the 1995 to 2010 time period. Although continued
use NNould require no significant development in estments, anticipated traffic growth
would necessitate high Shuttle and ELV flight rates and sizeable investments in ad-
ditional orbiters, expendables, ground processing and launch facilities, and operations
support.
Current funding lexels inhibit the timely development of a majority of necessary key
technologies.
Future Launch S-s 11;
Future U.S. launch s, stems must be driven by operations and support as well as
assured access considerations, in order to achieve operational flexibilitx and cost ef-
fecti% eness. A substantial reduction in recurring operations cost is achievable if
launch vehicles Pre designed for operational efficiency rather than maximuin per-
forinance.
Preferred s, ystems will employ new launh0 ,Chicles, such as an unmanned-cargo ve-
hicle (with supplemental use of ELVs for specific missions): and new launch and
flight operations approaches. This approach is cost-effective across a wide range of
mission scenarios and would improve assured access capabilities.
Integration of pay loads with the launch vehicle is a significant operational cost. New
processing and integration muthods approaching those applied to, cargo aircraft-and
other truly "operational" transportation systems must be developed. J
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C. OPTIONS FORSPACE TRANSPORTATION
Preliminary analysis by the Joint DOD / NASA Task Team indicated severe
shortfalls for space policies that utilize only one launch system due to high launch rates,
lack of flexibility, and assured access. [Ref. 1: p. 19].
New launch vehicle focus is on candidate launch vehicle systems composed of two
or more new primaij N chicle types which could be supplemented by current launch ve-
hicles. According to the Joint Task Team, three general categories of candidate launch
vehicles can be established:
, Type A A new unmanned cargo vehicle in the mid-1990's with a new manned ve-
hicle around 2002 and a partially or fully reusable new orbit transfer system (OTS)
in the intervening years.
, Type B The same as Type A with the exception of the additional capability of down
payload associated with the unmanned cargo vehicle. This could be attainable
through the use of recoverable payload canisters, a fully reusable flyback second-
stage and cargo bay, or other configurations.
Type C Fundamentally the same as A and B above with an additional cargo
vehicle(s). [Ref. I: p. 21]
An early inti oduction of a vehicle type described above -could keep Shuttle flight
rates nominal, while increasing assured access re!iability. The new vehicle could also
relieve dependence on mcre costly ELVs, while accommodating increasing launch de-
mand according to the Joint Task Team. The new vehicle could cxhibit cost reduction
through containerization of small pay loads and minimal or no pa3load support services
(e.g., power and environmental conditioning) aboard the launch vehicle. [Ref. 1: p. 21]
Evcn with a ne~v unmanned vehicle to reduce late-1990s Shuttle utilization, the Joint
Task Team recognizes a new manned vehicle is necessary for a mcre cost-effective, ro-
bust system capable of maintaining the United States' world leadership in space trans-
portation. The Shuttle fleet will be reaching service limits sometime in the 2000 to 2005
time frame and represents early 1970's technology. Rather than replenishing the Shuttle
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fleet, the Joint Task Team feels it would be advantageous to introduce a new manned
vehicle with a lower operating cost. [Ref. 1: p. 21]
According to the Joint Task Team, expendable launch vehicles require the least
technolog) development and allow the earliest available launch capability with low de-
velopment cost and risk. Also, new expendable vehicles would most likely use low-cost
current engines or derivatives of current technology engines. However, the study indi-
cates that high-technology based new expendable launch vehicles are competitive in
terms of total life-cycle costs. [Ref. 1: pp. 26-271
The Joint Task Team admits that partially reusable systems offer lower initial de-
velopment costs but higher operating costs than fully reusable concepts. The main
technological challenges for fully reusable vehicles are the recovery module,
aerothermodynamics and conuol. as well as a new hydrocarbon booster engine. [Ref.
1: p. 27]
Fully reusable launch sN stems generally require -advanced technologies. The single-
stage-to-orbit (SSTO) Nehicles like the proposed aero-sace plane require high perform-
ance liquid ox% gen, liquid hy drogen and, or liquid ox3 gen ,' hydrocarbon rocket engines.
AdditionalI, new light % eight structures, long-life thermal protection systems, and au-
tonomous avionics arc needed because of performance and weight sensitivity. [Ref. I:
p. 27
In addition to the performance technologies needed, investments in additional tech-
nologies and new des elopments are required to achieve major reductions in operations
costs (e.g., automation of manufacturing, checkout, etc.). New vehicles incorporating
these technologies caa achieve a ten-fold reduction compared to the present coats of
SISOO to S3000 per pound to orbit, according to the Joint Task Team. [Ref. 1: pp. 27-2S]
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D. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT DOD I NASA TASK TEAM
The Joint Task Team recommended the following:
* If new manned and unmanned launch systems and lower costs for space transpor-
tation are to be attained, the U.S. must commit to implementing a plan that is
complementary to other planned technology activities (e.g., the National Aero-
Space Plane, ongoing DOD,'NASA programs, and industry programs). The plan
must be focused to provide a base for new systems which can achieve the objective
of substantially reduced operating costs. The plan must support the development
of both evolutionary and revolutionary technology alternatives necessary to assure
continued U.S. world leadership in space transportation.
* Conduct studies to refine and confirm the cost beneficial investments which will
provide the most efficient operations and vehicle systems for the future.
* Reassess the transition to the next generation launch vehicles while considering all
elements of the proposed system as well as the current Space Shuttle and Titan
systems. [Ref. 38: pp. 23-24]
E. THE NATION'S DIRECTION
In 19SS, the .Congressional Office of Technology Assessment published Launch
Options for the Future: A Buyers Guide, which clearly defines options the United States
could pursue with new launch systems. To determine wh -h of the new space transpor-
tation alternatives is most appropriate and most cost-eflecuve, the United States must
first make some broad decisions about the future. Some of the fundamental questions
are presented in Table 16. [Ref. 39]
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Table 16. DECISIONS TO BE MADE
If the U.S. wishes to: I Then it should:
Maintain U.S. leadership Increase funLig for space transportation basic re-
in launch system technol- search, technology development, and applications.
ogy Maintaining leadership will require a NASA;DOD
technology development program across a range of
technologies.
Improve resilience (ability Fund the development of a new high capacity, high re-
to recover quickly from liability launch vehicle or expand current ground facili-
failure) of U.S. launch ties or reduce downtime after failures or improve the
systems reliability of current launch vehicles. At high launch
rates, developing a new launch vehicle is probably most
economical.
Increase launch vehicle Aggressively fund technologies to provide: (1) impro ed
reliability and safety subsystem reliability; (2) on-pad abort and in-flight en-
gine shutdown for escape from piloted N -.hicles; and (3)
redundancy and fault tolerance for critical systems.
Limit the future growth Maintain existing launch systems and limit expendi-
of NASA and DOD space tures on future development optiuns. Current capabil-
programs ities are adequate to supply both NASA and DOD if
the present level of U.S. space activities is maintained
or reduced.
Deploy the Space .tation Continue funding inprovements to the Space Shuttle
by the mid-1990's while and, or begin developing Shuttle-C. The currcnt Space
maintaining an aggressive Shuttle can launch the Space Station, but will do so
NASA science program more effectively with improvements or the assistance
of a Shuttle-C. Although Shuttle-C may not be as
economical as other new cargo vehicles at high launch
rates, iL is competitive if only a few heavy lift missions
are required each year.
Continue trend of launch- Commit to the de elopment of a new unmanned cargo
ins heavie; communi- vehicle by the mid to late 1990's. In theory, current
cations, navigation, and launch systems could be expanded to meet future needs;
reconnaissance satellites however, new systems are likely to be more reliable and
more cost effective.
Dramatically increase the Commit to the development of a new unmanned cargo
number and kind of other vehicle (e.g:, Advanced Launch System). Current
military space activities launch systems are neither sufficiently economical or
reliable to support a dramatically increased military
space program.
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F. NEW LAUNCH CONCEPTS
Although many new launch concepts are currently under investigation and;or de-
velopment, two concepts, the Advanced Launch System (ALS) and Shuttle-C (for
cargo), are systems being endorsed by NASA and DOD.
The Advanced Launch System (ALS) is a totally new launch system under study by
the Air Force and NASA that would be designed to launch large cargo paloads eco-
nomically at high launch rates. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
assumes a partially reusable vehicle featuring a flyback booster, a core stage N ith ex-
pendable tanks and a pa,,load faring, and a recoverable payload avionics module. [Ref.
41: p. x]
The Shuttle-C is an unmanned cargo vehicle, derived from the Shuttle, with a heavy
lift capacity of 100,000 to 150,000 pounds to low earth orbiL. Shuttle-C would use the
existing expendable external tank and reusable solid rocket boosters of the current
Shuttle, but would replace the Orbiter with an expendable cargo carrier. [Ref. 41: p. xl
I. Advanced Launch System (ALS)
On January 5, 19S8, President Reagan signed a Report to Congress creating a
joint DOD and NASA program for the development of the ALS. The report established
a joint program office headed by an Air Force program manager with a NASA deputy
program manager. The Department of Defense will lead the systems engineering and
integration, vehicle, ligistics, and paiload module while NASA leads liquid engine sys-
tems and the focused technology effort. [Ref. 37: p. 901
ALS is currently in a 25 month Phase II program that includes a mixture of
technology development and system analysis efforts. Full-scale development of the ALS
has not been approved. [Ref. 42: p. 4401
The goal of the Advanced Launch System (ALS) program is to design a low
cost, heavy lift launch system to serve U.S. needs at the turn of the century. However,
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because an ALS would require some tedinologies not fully developed at this time and
because NASA and the Air Force would like to prepare to meet any additional demand
for launch services in the mid 1990"s, they are also considering options for new interim,
high capacity launch systems based on current technology. [Ref. 21: p. 24]
The ALS seeks to provide the focused technology which will lead to a heavy-lift
launch system which is flexible, robust, reliable, responsive, operationally efficient, while
significantly lowering the cost of getting payloads into low earth orbit. The ALS goal
is to have an operational capability no later than 1998. [Ref. 36: p. 90]
The ALS development is focusing on both advanced technologies and im-
provements to current technologies. The focus of the program is on a broad payload
range which includes pa,loads from I to 220 thousand pounds. Additionally, managers
of current ELVs were asked to assess the application of ALS-developcd technologies to
current ELVs. [Ref. 40: p. 4411
The ALS goal of a S300 per pound payload launch cost was derived from a 25
per .-ear launch rate by the -ear 2005. However, reductions in planned flight rates and
the broadening payload range have reduced the focus on the S300 per pound cost goal.
The Joint Pr3gram .ffice acknowledges that the 5300 per pound goal is probably not
achievable for current mission models. [Ref. 40: p. 4411
The reference two-stage vehicle (See Figure S.) has an- expendable liquid oxy-
gen,' liquid hydrogen propellant core with three low-cost Space Transportation Main-
Engines (STME). Like most of the proposed ALS, the low-cost STME are yet to be
developed. This vehicle concept has a payload delivery capability of approximately
120,000 pounds to low earth orbit. [Ref. 41: p. 3]
Variants of this vehicle will use the same standard core and will deliver more or
less paxlo,.d by varying the arrange-nent, type, and number of boosters and booster en-
gines. [Ref. 41: p. 31
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ALS
Figure 8. Advanced Launch System Reference Vehicle
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The ALS will operate as a bulk cargo transport. To reduce cost, cargo inter-
faces will be minimized and standardized, ground processing functions will be stream-
lined and the cargo will be delivered to standard orbits. Payload peculiar ser% ices and
on orbit propulsion, if required, will be provided by payload owners. [Ref. 44: p. 4]
Although being intensively reviewed, preliminary estimates indicate that the de-
velopment and first flight cost of the ALS would be in the-range of S1.7 to S2.0 billion,
in FY 1989 dollars. [Ref 42: p. 4361
2. Shuttle-C
NASA's version of the heavy lift vehicle is the Shutt!e-C. which in several as-
pects competes with the ALS. The Shuttle-C would be an unmanned cargo vehicle
based primarily on Shuttle technology. If Shuttle-C is used to ship major subassemblies
of the space station to orbit, one Shuttle-C flight could replace two or three Shuttle
missions. Shuttle-C could reduce the need to fl, all of NASA's planned Shuttle missions.
[Ref. 21: pp. 24-251
NASA feels that, if approved, the Shuttle-C could deliver approximately 100
to 150 thousands pounds to orbit depending on whether two or three main engines are
used. Since the Shuttle-C concept has an unmanned cargo element in place of the
Shuttle orbiter, a new processing facility would likely be required for this cargec element.
The cargo element design allows for use of existing as well as planned STS pay!oad
processing capabilities. The Shuttle-C could use the same production capability for
External Tanks and SRB's as the STS. However, NASA envisions flying Shuttle-C on
average only three times per %ear, with an associated reduction in the number of Shuttle
flights. Hence, there will be no significant difference in External Tank and SRB pro-
duc-ion efficiencies. [Ref. 42: pp. 452-4531
The National Space Launch Program submitted to the Congress the following
statement on Shuttle-C:
Studies to date have concluded that the Shuttle-C could meet pctential -near term
requirements for heavy-lift wiLn minimum developmeat cost (although without the
full long-term operating cost reduction, flexibility, and resiliency desired). Shuttle-C
studies are examining the potential for increasing the flexibility, robustness, and
cost- effectiveness of the Space Shuttle fleet to meet NASA unmanned launch -re-
quirements, including Space Station Freedom assembly and planetary payloads.
[Ref. 42: pp. 435-436]
In August 1987, as part of concept and definition study efforts, NASA initiated
Shuttle-C st'idies focusing on maximum utilization of Shuttle hardware, facilities, and
operations. NASA projects that the system will offer a near term heavy-lift capability
with minimum cost and schedule risk. NASA feels the Shuttle-C could provide a step
toward an early robust national launch posture in the mid-1990s. [Ref. 37: p. 881
In 1989. NASA was assessing Shuttle-C as a possible new start for FY 1991.
If proposed, Shuttle-C funding would be a stand-alone new NASA start. In other
words, Shuttle-C .ouli not be associated with other on-going activities, an additional
orbiter, or the orbiter spares. [Ref. 42: p. 436j
NASA has baselined -the current Shuttle for all space station delivery and as-
sembl, needs. NASA feels the current Space Shuttle can deliver and support the as-
sembly of all statien elements. If Shuttle-C was approved and made an integral part of
station planning. it could be used to reduce the number of Space Shuttle launches re-
quired to assemble the Space Station. This would be accomplished by placing fully
outfitted habitat and experiment laboratories into orbit, climinating the need to accom-
plish this task in space. NASA admits the use of an unmanned vehicle must be sensitive
to the need for a manned presence to complete the asscmbl. process, and for appropriate
services to the unassembled pieces prior to assembly wvith zhe growing space btation.
Studies are continuing to examine-the utilization of Shutle-C for Space Station assem-
bly. [Ref. 42: p. 4361
Three parallel systems dermition contracts were begun in FY 1987, to define a
shuttle-derived %chicle configuration most appropriate to satisfi. the anticipated national
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needs beginning in the mid-!990's. The current Shuttle-C concept was a result of these
studies. (See Figure 9. Source: Ref 43) These contracts have been extended through
the end of FY 19S9 and, along with in-house efforts, are further defining the Shutzle-C
configuration. FY 1990 funds will be needed to continue the activity to mature the
Shuttle-C system design in preparation for a new start proposal in FY i991. [Ref 42:
p. 4531
Shuttle-C would have the advantage of using much of the-same technology and
many of the same parts that have already proved successful in Shuttle flights. To keep
fixed costs down, it would use the same launch pads, integration facilities, and launch
support crews now used for the Shuttle. f-owe er, another stand-down lit.e the 1986 to
1938 stand-down of the current shuttle would result in delavine Shuttle-C flights for the
same reasons. [Ref. 21: p. 251
3. Cost Considerations %sith Shuttl2-C
* Table 17 (Source: ReE. 21) represents the cost considerations that space plan-
ners have with the Shuttle-C as well as the Shuttle-C's relationship ixith the cgrrent
Shuttle:
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Table 17. SHUTTLE-C COST CONSIDERATIONS
Orbiter Processing Not having to process a Shuttle orbiter would likely speed up
launch operations and therefore reduce costs con, ared to the
current Shuttle. However, the Shuttle-C would still need to be
assembled, integrated, and tested prior to each flight. If the
Shuttle-C were not specifically designed for simplicity and ease
of operation, its operational costs could grow to become a
significant fraction of the cost of preparing for launch.
Simultaneous Shuttle-C will affect the processing flow of the current Shuttle
Shuttle-C and Cur- orbiter. Because the Shuttle-C would be sihnilar to the current
rent Shuttle Proc- Shuttle, it would be processed in the same facilities as the cur-
essing rent Shuttle.
Shuttle-C Process- Because NASA intends to use the Shuttle-C for transporting
ing Time major components fo the space station to orbit, which are
likely to be of greater value than the vehicle, NASA would
have considerable incentive to process the Shuttle-C as care-
fully as it processes the current Shuttle, and with the same
crews and procedures.
Shuttle Facilities The Shuttle facilities, including the launch pads, may constrain
NASA's ability to reach the desired flight rate projected for a
four orbiter fleet, and simultaneously launch Shuttle-C two or
three times per year. Launching both vehicles will require ei-
ther shifting some payloads from the current Shuttle to
Shuttle-C and flying fewer orbiter missions, or building new
facilities to accommodate the Shuttle-C.
Parts Because Shuttle-C would share many of the same parts as the
current Shuttle, delays may occur in one or the other launch
system should the parts supply become constrained. On the
other hand, because parts become cheaper when purchased in
quantity, the existence of a Shuttle-C might reduce the costs
of some components.
Mission Operations Mission operations for the Shuttle-C would be simpler and
possibly less costly than the current Shuttle. Because the
Shuttle-C would not carry humans, mission operations would
consist primarily of control, navigation, guidance, and releas-










Figure 9. The Shuttle-C Concept
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"I. OBSERVATIONS
The Space Shuttle was an attempt at developing a low-cost, routine access to space.
But the Space Shuttle has had some unique cost ffectiveness difficulties that restrict it
from reaching that gual.
A. SPACE POLICY
The Space Shuttle isas inhibited by lack of a clear, consistent and concise National
space policy.
If the administration and Congress had mandated in the late 1960's that the United
States will research, design, and develop a low-cost, routine access to space while inves-
tigating all possible technologies in doing so, the resulting launch system would have
been much different than the current Space Shuttle.
As originally planned, the Space Shuttle was to be an integral part of an Earth
orbiting space station ferrying people and supplies back and forth to earth. When the
space station was put on "hold" for budgetary reasons, NASA continued to pursue the
Space Shuttle, although now the space shuttle had a new mission - - routine, cost-
effective access to space to all potential users of space. However, the Space Shuttle was
not originally envisioned for cost-effe-tive space transportation for all potential users;
it was to be part of the space station.
If the United States had wanted to invest in developing a cost-effective, routine ac-
cess to space, it should have issued clear long-term goals as well as a defined plan for
developing and incorporating low-cost space transportation systems.
A long-term plan is needed presently as well. Instituting a long-term research, de-
velopment and technology application plan for cost-effective space transportation would
serve as a road map for the future. The current process of the administration setting the
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space goal while the Congress, who allocates the funds, either supports or does not
support the goal, inhibits the production of efficient space transportation systems.
B. SPACE SHUTTLE FUNDING
Budgetary constraints during Space Shuttle development caused schedule slippage, cost
overruns, and limited the Space Shuttle in reaching its full potential.
When NASA did not receive the required funds during Space Shuttle development,
NASA management had to take the following actions:
* Slip the schedule,
* defer some work,
* delete some work, or
* reprogram funds
which had profound effects on the resulting Space Shuttle. The finished Space Shuttle
was not as originally planned, behind in schedule, and over in costs.
Developing new technologies in space transportation will most certainly unveil hid-
den costs that were not originally seen. This was evident with the Space Shuttle. When
an unforeseen cost arose and funds were noL available, NASA had to take actions, V
those listed above, to solve the problem.
if the United States is to pursue new low-cost space transportation, the necessary
funds must be guaranteed to do so. Limiting or constraining funds on developing new
space transportation systems will only serve to compromise that system and lessen the
system's ability to reach full cost-effective potential.
C. SPACE SHUTTLE COMPLEXITY
The Space Shuttle is the most complex launch system ever built iihicli has restricted
its ability to be a routine, low-cost access to space.
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The Shuttle was an revolutionary step in launch systems and was not designed for
operational simplicity. Many of its s stems are highly complex, and made up of a mul-
titude of parts that need to be inspected or repaired.
For example, each of the Solid Rocket Boosters, considered one of the simpler
Shuttle elements, contains about 75,000 parts and components. Of these, about 5,000
are removed, inspected, and replaced or refurbished after each Shuttle flight. The
Thermal Protection System, composed of over 31,000 tiles, requires careful inspection
and-repair, an extremely labor intensive operation. In addition, each tile must be tested
for adherence to the vehicle.
If the United States wants low-cost access to space, then lower performing, simpler
systems must be investigated. The trend to maximize new technologies must be bal-
anced with the desired goal and needs of the space transportation system.
D. SAFETY AND THE MANNED ELEMENT
The human presence in the Space Shuttle Orbiter increases time and complexity of
launch operations.
Because the Shuttle carries human crews, and because it is a highly visible symbol
of American technology, safety issues receive unusually great attention. As a result of
the investigation of Shuttle subsystems following the loss of Challenger and its crew, the
Shuttle system has undergone many major safety related changes, which have led to
considerable s)steni redesign. These changes have also increased the time and com-
plexity of launch operations.
Prior to the loss of Challenger, NASA had reduced the turnaround time necessary
to prepare the Shuttle orbiter for flight to about 55 workdays. Since the Shuttle. has
returned to flight, the turnaround times have been on the order of 150 workdays and
NASA hopes to decrease this toabout 75 days. [Ref. 21: p. 211
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If the United States continues to pursue the space station and desire: to maintain
world leadership in space, Lhen a manned launch system will be necessary. However,
routine launches of satellites can be performed without a manned element. The Shuttle
has proven that a manned element drastically increases the costs of space traasportation.
E. SHUTTLE STILL IN DEVELOPMENT
The Space Shuttle is not yet a fully operational system and has not proven to be rou-
tine access to space.
Although NASA declared the Space Shuttle operational after the fourth flight, it has
as yet not achieved true operational status. Because the Shuttle is undergoing major
design changes, it requires larger launch operations staff than an operational system.
For example, NASA employs about 5000 engineers at KSC, Marshall Flight Center, and
JSC who work on.Shuttle systems. They have strong incentives to implement changes
for increasing safety and performance, many of which increase the time and cost of
preparing a shuttle for flight. On the other hand, there are few incentives for increasing
operations efficiency and reducing costs. [Ref. 21: p. 21]
If the Space Shuttle is to continue evolving, 'NASA must control the evolution to-
wards increased efficiency and simplicity. Upgrades to the Space Shuttle must be con-
sidered with a cost-effective mind-set; however, because of the manned element, safety
njust always be paramount.
F. NEW LAUNCH SYSTEMS
Launch demand isill determine if developing new loiv-cost space transportation systems
or upgrading and modifying current systems is more cost-effective.
The United States possesses the technology to improve the capabilities of existing
launch vehicles and facilities through modifications. Incremental improvements to cur-
rent systems could reduce their operations cost and increase their lift capacity. If im-
provements in vehicle reliability can be achieved, then current vehicles could be used
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with greater confidence at higher flight rates. By improving existing vehicles and ground
facilities and buying more launch vehicles, tlie United States could easily increase its
launch capabilities.
The costs of developing improvements to existing launch vehicles must be compared
to developing new vehicles.
The demand for launch services in the future will be one of the primary determinants
of the value of investing in new launch systems. If future missions are as infrequent and
diverse as they have been previously, launch options such as the Shuttle-C and the ALS
will not likely reduce average launch costs significantly, although these s.stems will most
likely improve launch reliability, capability, and resiliency. If launch demands continue
to increase, it would most likely be more economical to develop and procure new launch
vehicles that-could be processed and launched efficiently at high launch rates.
New launch vehicles could lift heavier paioads but would require more investment
than impro'ing current vehicles. Upgrading existing -ehicles would ha~e low develop-
ment costs but would save less on operational costs. Additionally, launching current
vehicles at high rates would require improvements in reliability, back-up launch -vehicles
and facilities, or reductions in "downtime" fcllowing failures. If such changes could not
be achie ed economically with current vehicles, then it would appear pursuing new cargo
vehicles is a better course of action.
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ViiI. LESSONS LEARNED
If the United States is to pursue new heavy-lift space transportation, the Space
Shuttle program and the lessons learned from it must be considered so the most efficient
and cost-effective systems can be built. The following are areas in which new heavy-lift
launch systems must be fully supported for low-cost access to space to be achieved:
A clear, concise, and consistent national space transportation policy must be ar-
ticulated and instituted.
* Manned launch vehicles must be utilized primarily when a human presence is nec-
essar,. Use manned vehicles sparingly.
* If the Space Shuttle is to continue to evolve, the evolution must be towards effi-
ciency and simplicity. The desire to upgrade and increase performance must be
weig hed against cost benefits.
* Realistic and honest evaluation of future launch demand must be addressed.
Launch demand is the key element in determining the cost-efl'ectiveness of new
launch systems like ALS and Shuttle-C.
* New launch in :iatives must have stable funding and support.
* Complementary, simple, lower performing systems must also be considered for
routine, unmanned launches. Modifving current ELVs may be an attractive ap-
proach for the near term.
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APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS
ALS Advanced Launch System
APU Automatic Positioning Unit
CBO Congressional Budget Office
DDT&E Design, Development, Test and Evaluation
DOD Department of Defense
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle
ESA European Space Agency
ET External Tank
EVA Extra Vehicular Activity
FFP Firm Fixed Price
FMOF First Manned Orbital Flight
FY Fiscal Year
GPS Global Positioning System
IOC Initial Operating Capability
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LEASAT Leased Satellite
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LSA Launch Service Agreement
MLV Medium Launch Vehicle
MPT Main Propulsion Test
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRC National Research Council
NSDD National Security Decision Directive
OMB Office of Budget and Management
OMS Orbiter Maneuvering System
OTA Office Of Technology Assessment
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OTS Orbital Transfer System
OV Orbiter Vehicle
PIP Payload Integration Plan
PSAC President's Science Advisory Committee
RFP Request for Proposal
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
SSTO Single Stage to Orbit
STME Space Transportation Main Engine
STG Space Task Group
STS Space Transportation System
TPS Thermal Protection System
TRS Teleoperator Retrieval System
VAFB Vandenburg Air Force Base
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